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One who grabs too much has not grabbed anything, but one that 
grabs just a little has surely grabbed that much. 
—Babylonian Talmud, Yoma 80a 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court’s ruling that West Virginia Su-
preme Court Justice Brent Benjamin’s decision not to recuse himself 
from a case involving a major donor to his judicial election campaign 
violated Due Process1 sparked a storm of interest in the (in)adequacy 
of the judicial disqualification system.2  Contemporary recusal law 
makes conclusory determinations of actual or apparent judicial bias, 
resulting in an inconsistent doctrine that allows dishonest judges to 
resist recusal and supplant litigants’ legal rights in favor of their own 
personal agendas.3  The current approach also erodes public confi-
dence in the justice system by under and over-enforcing bias-based 
recusal,4 and its focus on top-down mandatory disqualification fails to 
adequately encourage judges to be personally and professionally 
integrious.5 
This Note suggests that these problems might be mitigated by 
comprehensively rethinking our approach to judicial disqualification 
based on halacha, traditional Jewish law.6  Halachic recusal law offers 
an alternative to the current American approach, a jurisprudence that 
is grounded in courts’ and judges’ personal and professional duties, 
and which empowers jurists to develop their own integrity by limiting 
mandatory disqualification and relying instead on judges’ duty-
consciousness and self-disciplining decisions to voluntarily recuse.7 
Part I of this Note reviews the jurisprudential underpinnings and 
substantive rules of American and traditional Jewish disqualification 
law.  Part II briefly compares these two systems, highlighting the 
 
 1. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256–57 (2009); see 
also infra notes 81–84 and 101–105 and accompanying text. 
 2. See, e.g., Gerard J. Clark, Caperton’s New Right to Independence in Judges, 
58 DRAKE L. REV. 661 (2010); Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Disqualification After 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company: What’s Due Process Got to Do With It?, 63 
BAYLOR L. REV. 368  (2011); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Completing Caperton and Clarify-
ing Common Sense Through Using the Right Standard for Constitutional Judicial 
Recusal, 29 REV. LITIG. 249 (2010); Symposium: Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 
60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 215 (2010). 
 3. See infra Part III.A.1.  
 4. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 5. See infra Part III.A.3.  
 6. See generally infra Part III.B. 
 7. See infra Part I.B.1. 
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principle differences between the American and halachic approaches 
to recusal, which stem from these doctrines’ respective foundations in 
rights-based and duty-focused jurisprudence.  Part III develops a du-
ty-focused alternative to contemporary recusal law by first highlight-
ing some deficiencies in the current system, thereby demonstrating 
the need for reform,8 and by then reconceptualizing judicial recusal 
based on Jewish law’s moralizing, duty-oriented approach to remov-
ing judges and promoting judicial integrity.9 
I.  JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION IN AMERICAN AND 
TRADITIONAL JEWISH LAW 
This Part provides necessary background for considering the rela-
tive merits of contemporary American and traditional Jewish recusal 
law by explaining the jurisprudential underpinnings and substantive 
doctrines.  Section I.A. discusses the American law of judicial disqual-
ification, and Section I.B. lays out the basic contours of the halachic 
approach to removing judges. 
A. The American Approach to Judicial Disqualification 
This Section discusses the contemporary American approach to ju-
dicial disqualification.  Section I.A.1 explores the two primary objec-
tives of modern recusal doctrine: protecting litigants’ rights against 
biased rulings, and promoting public confidence in the justice system.  
Building on this framework, Section I.A.2 summarizes the substantive 
grounds for a judge’s removal under current federal, state, and Amer-
ican Bar Association rules. 
1. The Underlying Goals of American Recusal Jurisprudence 
Contemporary judicial disqualification law is built on a dual con-
cern for protecting the rights of litigants in individual cases and with 
preserving public confidence in the court system generally.  Litigants 
are entitled to a court ruling based on the legal merits of their case ra-
ther than extraneous, non-legal factors.10  When judges rule based on 
their personal values, their decisions subvert litigants’ legal rights and 
 
 8. See infra Part III.A. 
 9. See infra Part III.B. 
 10. See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DIS-
QUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 33 (2d ed. 2007) (“Every person who appears in court ex-
pects to receive a determination of his case based on the merits of the case—rather 
than on extrinsic circumstances.”). 
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amount to a miscarriage of actual justice.11  Judges must therefore in-
terpret and apply the law without regard for personal preferences or 
value judgments;12 they must decide each case impartially, preserving 
our justice system as one “of laws and not of men.”13  Disqualification 
law attempts to protect litigants’ legal dues from biased rulings by 
removing judges from cases that implicate their personal prefer-
ences.14  Thus, the goal of judicial “impartiality is not an end in itself.  
It is an instrumental value designed to preserve a different end alto-
gether: the rule of law. . . .  [T]he ultimate goal is to enable judges . . . 
to resolve disputes between parties on a case-by-case basis according 
to the applicable facts and law . . . .”15 
In addition to protecting litigants’ rights from actual injustice, dis-
qualification law seeks to promote confidence in the court system by 
avoiding even the appearance of judicial injustice.  The efficacy of our 
courts depends on society’s willingness to submit disputes to them 
and accept their rulings.16  If the public perceives the justice system as 
 
 11. Recusal law promotes actual justice by ensuring that judicial rulings are based 
on the rule of law and not on judges’ personal preferences, but also concentrates on 
maintaining the appearance of justice. See generally Sarah M. R. Cravens, In Pursuit 
of Actual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2007).  This focus on appearances—sometimes 
to the neglect of reality—engenders criticism of disqualification jurisprudence. See 
infra notes 279–282 and accompanying text.   
 12. See ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Preamble, cl. 1 (2007) [hereinafter 
ABA CODE] (“An independent, fair and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our 
system of justice.  The United States legal system is based upon the principle that an 
independent, impartial, and competent judiciary, composed of men and women of 
integrity, will interpret and apply the law that governs our society.”). 
 13. JOHN ADAMS, NOVANGLUS AND MASSACHUSETTENSIS 84 (1819); see LARRY 
ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES 11–25 (2001); LON. R. FULLER, 
THE MORALITY OF LAW 56 (1964); see also Norman L. Greene, How Great Is Ameri-
ca’s Tolerance for Judicial Bias? An Inquiry into the Supreme Court’s Decisions in 
Caperton and Citizens United, Their Implications for Judicial Elections, and Their 
Effect on the Rule of Law in the United States, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 873, 884–85 
(2010) (“The lack of bias is a ‘cardinal principle of justice’ and an ‘indispensible fea-
ture of democracy.’”).  
 14. See FLAMM, supra note 10, at 33 (“Every person who appears in court expects 
to receive a determination of his case based on the merits of the case—rather than on 
extrinsic circumstances—and there is no question that the right to a fair trial includes 
the right to be tried by an impartial and unbiased judge.”); id. at 53–54 (“[A] party 
has the right to have her case heard and decided by a judge who is . . . disinterested, 
dispassionate, and can approach the facts in an objective and impartial manner.”). 
 15. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 65 
(2003). 
 16. See Irving R. Kaufman, Lions or Jackals: The Function of a Code of Judicial 
Ethics, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 5 (1970) (“Possessed of neither purse nor 
sword, [the judiciary] depends primarily on the willingness of members of society to 
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corrupted by biased judges deciding cases based on their personal 
preferences, “the moral authority of the courts is critically under-
mined,”17 hampering their effectiveness.  Judges must therefore not 
only be, but must also appear to be unbiased.18  The Supreme Court 
recognized this principle in Offutt v. United States, noting that “jus-
tice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”19  Modern recusal juris-
prudence addresses this concern by disqualifying judges not only 
when they are biased, but even when they merely appear partial.20 
This heavy focus on eradicating bias is a relatively new develop-
ment in recusal jurisprudence.  At common law, judges were only dis-
qualified for being a party to a case by virtue of their having some in-
terest in the outcome,21 and early American recusal law tracked this 
 
follow its mandates.” (citing Simon E. Sobeloff, Striving for Impartiality in the Fed-
eral Courts, 24 FED. CIR. B.J. 286, 286 (1964))). 
 17. JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 7 (1974). 
 18. United States v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 497 F.2d 107, 109 (5th Cir. 1974) (re-
ferring to apparent impartiality as “the palladium of our judicial system”); see also 
State v. Alderson, 922 P.2d 435, 452 (Kan. 1996) (“It is vital to the legal system that 
the public perceive the system as impartial.”); Baier v. Hampton, 440 N.W.2d 712, 
715 (N.D. 1989) (“[The court’s] primary concern is the preservation of public respect 
and confidence in the integrity of the judicial system . . . .”). 
 19. 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); see also Barker v. Sec’y of State’s Office of Mo., 752 
S.W.2d 437, 439 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (“One of the fundamental precepts which gov-
ern the sound administration of justice is that . . . an appearance of justice must be 
maintained.”). 
 20. See Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980) (“[The] overriding concern with appearances, which 
also pervades the Code of Judicial Conduct and the ABA Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, stems from the recognized need for an unimpeachable judicial system in 
which the public has unwavering confidence.”); Kevin J. Mitchell, Neither Purse nor 
Sword: Lessons Europe Can Learn from American Courts’ Struggle for Democratic 
Legitimacy, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 653, 657 (2007) (“Public confidence is vital to 
a well-functioning judiciary, so regardless of whether actual bias exists, the appear-
ance can be sufficient to remove a judge from a particular case.”).  See generally 
FLAMM, supra note 10, at 108–13. 
 21. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259 (2009) (quoting 
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)); John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 
56 YALE L.J. 605, 609 (1947) (“The common law of disqualification . . . was clear and 
simple: a judge was disqualified for a direct pecuniary interest and for nothing else.”); 
Mark Andrew Grannis, Note, Safe Guarding the Litigants Constitutional Right to a 
Fair and Impartial Forum: A Due Process Approach to Improprieties Arising From 
Judicial Campaign Contributions from Lawyers, 86 MICH. L. REV. 382, 387–88 
(1987).   Some sources indicate that this description of common law disqualification 
doctrine is overly restrictive, and that Lord Coke’s maxim that “no man may be a 
judge in his own case,” 1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 141a 
(1628) (“[A]liquis non debet esse judex in propria causa.”), was actually understood 
to include a broader array of circumstances implicating judges’ impartiality. See Phil-
ip A. Hamburger, Revolution and Judicial Review: Chief Justice Holt’s Opinion in 
City of London v. Wood, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2091 (1994) (arguing that Coke’s maxim 
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English doctrine.22  In the early twentieth century, however, perhaps 
in response to changing perceptions and new problems related to ju-
dicial impartiality, new legislative initiatives began to focus disqualifi-
cation practice on actual and apparent judicial bias.23  Recusals are 
 
and the common law doctrine was broadly based in natural law jurisprudence and 
classical liberal political theory).  For example, Lord Bracton followed Roman prece-
dent in disqualifying judges on the mere suspicion of bias. See 6 BRACTON, LEGIBUS 
ET CONSUETUNDINIBUS ANGLIE 249 (Twiss ed. 1883) (“[T]he only cause for recusal is 
a suspicion, which arises from many causes, as if the judge be a blood relative of the 
plaintiff, his vassal or subject, his parent or friend, or an enemy of the tenant, his 
kinsman or his pleader in that cause or another, and in any such like capacity.”); 
CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS, Codex, lib. 3, tit. 1, no. 16 translated in Harrington Puttman, 
Recusation, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 3 n.10 (1923) (“[B]ecause it is our pleasure that all 
litigations should proceed without suspicion, let it be permitted to him, who thinks 
the judge under suspicion to recuse him before issue joined”).  Some cases support 
Bracton’s broad view of common law recusal. See, e.g., City of London v. Wood, 
(1702) 88 Eng. Rep. 1592 (K.B.); see also GRANT HAMMOND, JUDICIAL RECUSAL 11–
13 (2009) (recognizing that at common law, judges were disqualified for being party 
to a case even if they lacked pecuniary interests in the outcome); Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Chief William’s Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the Duty to Sit, 57 BUFF. L. 
REV. 813, 839 n.75 (2009).  Blackstone, supported by several prior cases, rejected 
Bracton’s approach. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 361 (1765–1769) (“[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favor 
in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority 
greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.  And should the fact at any time 
prove flagrantly such, as the delicacy of the law will not presume beforehand, there is 
no doubt but that such misbehavior would draw down a heavy censure from those to 
whom the judge is accountable for his conduct.”); see also Between the Parishes of 
Great Charte v. Kennington, (1726) 93 Eng. Rep. 1107 (K.B.) (disqualifying judges 
from deciding a case involving the removal of a pauper that the judges’ home county 
was otherwise obligated to financially support); The Case of Foxham in Com. Wilts, 
(1706) 91 Eng. Rep. 514 (K.B.) (disqualifying judge who held another public office 
that was the subject of the case); Anonymous, (1698) 91 ENG. REP. 343 (K.B.) (laying 
“by the heels” the Mayor of Hereford for presiding over an ejectment action involv-
ing one of his own tenants); Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1608) (dis-
qualifying physician review board from assessing fines against unlicensed practition-
ers because the fines were received by the members of the board). 
 22. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 543–44 (1994); Edward G. Burg, 
Comment, Meeting the Challenge: Rethinking Judicial Disqualification, 69 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1445, 1480–81 (1981); Richard E. Flamm, History of and Problems with the 
Federal Judicial Disqualification Framework, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 751, 754 (2010); 
Stempel, supra note 21, at 841 (“The English view . . . was largely incorporated by the 
colonial and subsequent American legal system of the eighteenth century.”).  For ex-
amples of early American disqualification laws, see An Act for Regulating Processes 
in the Courts of the United States, and Providing Compensations for the Officers of 
the Said Courts, and for Jurors and Witnesses, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278 (1792) [herein-
after 1792 Act]; MD. CONST. of 1776, art. IV, § 7. 
 23. See generally Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Discipline and the Appearance 
of Impropriety: What the Public Sees Is what the Judge Gets, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1914 
(2010). 
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currently governed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455,24 by the American 
Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct,25 which has been 
adopted in some form by forty-nine States,26 and by the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution.27 
2. Grounds for Disqualification in American Law 
Judges may be removed in a variety of circumstances, including 
where they have a financial stake in a case, are closely related to par-
ties or attorneys, accept bribes or gifts from parties or attorneys, or 
have extra-judicial knowledge about a case.  These substantive 
grounds for removal are not disqualifying per se; they are indicia of 
actual or apparent judicial misconduct.28  As Professor Leubsdorf 
notes, “disqualification law is clearly directed at the likelihood of 
warped judgment, with a judge’s financial interest or familial stake in 
the case as just one circumstance from which to infer such a likeli-
hood.”29  Thus, in Tumey v. Ohio,30 the Supreme Court disqualified a 
 
 24. The first federal disqualification statute was passed in 1792. See 1792 Act, su-
pra note 22.  This law remained in effect without significant changes until Congress 
passed sections 20 and 21 of the Judicial Code, which greatly expanded the grounds 
for disqualifying Federal judges. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 23, § 20, 36 Stat. 1090.  
These provisions were slightly revised in 1948, and were then recodified as 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 144, 455. See Act of May 24, 1949, ch.139, §65, 63 Stat. 99; Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 
646, § 455, 62 Stat. 908.  Congress overhauled the law in 1974 to bring it into harmony 
with the ABA Cannons, which were far more stringent than the Federal require-
ments then in force. See Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609; see 
also Susan E. Barton, Note, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Courts: Maintain-
ing an Appearance of Justice Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, 1978 U. ILL. L. F. 863, 868 
(1978) (noting that under the pre-1974 federal statutes “federal judges were governed 
by disparate ethical and statutory standards”).  For a general discussion of the history 
of federal disqualification rules see FLAMM, supra note 10, at 669–750; Flamm, supra 
note 22, at 753–59. 
 25. ABA CODE, supra note 12, R. 2.11.  The original ABA Cannons of Judicial 
Conduct were issued in 1924, perhaps in response to Judge Kenesaw Mountain Lan-
dis’s serving as both a federal judge and the first commissioner of Major League 
Baseball.  The ABA standards were revised in 1972 and 1990, and the current version 
was adopted in 2007.  See generally McKoski, supra note 23, at 1921–36 (2010). 
 26. See Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding when a 
Judge’s Impartiality “Might Reasonably be Questioned,” 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
55, 55 (2000). 
 27. See FLAMM, supra note 10, at 30–39; see also infra Part I.A.2.f. 
 28. See Burg, supra note 22, at 1480–82; Note, Disqualification of a Judge on the 
Ground of Bias, 41 HARV. L. REV. 78, 80 (1927); see also supra note 15 and accom-
panying text. 
 29. John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 237, 247 (1987). 
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town mayor from serving as a municipal judge, in part, because he 
would receive additional compensation only if he convicted the de-
fendants appearing before him.  The Court did not find that the 
mayor’s obvious interest in the outcome of each case was disqualify-
ing per se.  Instead, the Court disqualified the mayor because his in-
terest threatened his impartiality, making it unlikely that he would be 
able to “hold the balance nice, clear, and true.”31  
This Section reviews the substantive grounds for disqualification, 
which the law considers indicative of actual or apparent judicial bias.  
Section I.A.2.a. considers disqualification based on a judge’s mani-
festing actual or apparent bias.  Section I.A.2.a. discusses when judges 
might be disqualified for a bias resulting from a financial interest in a 
case; Section I.A.2.c. for a familial relationship to litigants or attor-
neys; Section I.A.2.d. for accepting bribes or gifts from parties ap-
pearing in court; and Section I.A.2.e. for possessing extra-judicial 
knowledge about a case. 
a. Bias and the Appearance of Bias 
A judge’s impartiality is the most “fundamental” and “self-evident” 
ground for a fair judicial system.32  In practice, however, it is more dif-
ficult to directly remove a judge for bias than it is to disqualify a judge 
on other substantive grounds like financial interest, which merely in-
dicate potential partiality.  This is because whereas removal for ex-
ternal indications of possible bias relies on objectively observable 
facts, direct disqualification for bias “is focused on the mental attitude 
or disposition of the judge toward a party to the litigation,”33 which is 
often not objectively demonstrable.34  In light of the difficulties in-
volved in correctly evaluating judges’ subjective states of mind, chal-
lenged judges are presumed to be impartial.35  To remove an allegedly 
biased judge, a party must overcome this presumption by demonstrat-
 
 30. 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Seth E. Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial Interest as Grounds for Disqualifi-
cation of Federal Judges, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 662, 662 (1984). 
 33. Freeman v. State, 757 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988). 
 34. See FLAMM, supra note 10, at 56 (“[B]ias is ordinarily not an empirically prov-
able fact.  It is, rather, a shorthand way of referring to the ‘attitude’ or ‘state of mind’ 
of a judge who cannot be trusted to act in a detached and impartial manner.”). 
 35. See Franklin v. McCaughtry, 398 F.3d 955, 959 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The general 
presumption is that judges are honest, upright individuals and thus that they rise 
above biasing influences.”); State v. DeGroff, No. 30758-8-II, 2005 WL 1540810, at *8 
(Wash. Ct. App. June 29, 2005) (“A judge is presumed to perform his functions regu-
larly and properly, without bias or prejudice.”). 
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ing that the judge manifested a predisposition for or against a party or 
an attorney.36 
Sections 144 and 455(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code offer 
two avenues for removing a biased judge.  Section 144, the “Peremp-
tory Disqualification Statute,” protects litigants from actually biased 
rulings by disqualifying judges that have “a personal bias or prejudice 
either against [the movant] or in favor of any adverse party.”37  Judg-
es challenged under section 144 must accept the facts alleged in a sec-
tion 144 affidavit as true,38 and may consider only whether those facts 
are sufficient to reasonably suggest the presence of bias.39  In deciding 
section 144 motions, judges consider whether the facts are stated with 
peculiarity, whether they would convince a reasonable person that the 
judge is actually biased,40 and whether they are factual allegations or 
merely opinions or conclusions.41 
Section 455(a) goes further to preserve public confidence in the 
courts by disqualifying judges that merely appear biased.42  Under 
section 455, a judge is disqualified when a party demonstrates that a 
 
 36. See ABA CODE, supra note 12, R. 2.3 cmt. 2 (“[M]anifestations of bias . . . in-
clude but are not limited to epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyp-
ing; attempted humor based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile 
acts; suggestions of connections between race, ethnicity, or nationality and crime; and 
irrelevant references to personal characteristics. Even facial expressions and body 
language can convey to parties and lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media, and 
others an appearance of bias or prejudice.”). 
 37. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2006).   
 38. See, e.g., United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 582 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[A] district 
judge faced with a motion for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 144, must accept the 
allegations of the moving party as true.”); Weatherhead v. Globe Int’l., Inc., 832 F.2d 
1226, 1227 (10th Cir. 1987) (“Under § 144, the judge cannot assess the truth of the 
facts alleged.”). 
 39. See generally FLAMM, supra note 10, at 692–94. 
 40. See, e.g., United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1540 (11th Cir. 1987) (per 
curiam), cert. denied sub nom. Bd. of Trs. of Ala. State Univ. v. Auburn Univ., 487 
U.S. 1210 (1988). 
 41. See, e.g., United States v. Vespe, 868 F.2d 1328, 1340 (3d Cir. 1989).   
 42. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006) (“Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the 
United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned.”); see Arocena v. United States, 721 F. Supp. 528, 
530 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“The purpose of section 455(a) is to promote confidence in the 
judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety.” (citing Hardy v. United 
States, 878 F.2d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 1989))); see also In re Antar, 71 F.3d 97, 101 (3d Cir. 
1995) (“Because we seek to protect the public’s confidence in the judiciary, our in-
quiry focuses not on whether the judge actually harbored subjective bias, but rather 
on whether the record, viewed objectively, reasonably supports the appearance of 
prejudice or bias.”). See generally FLAMM, supra note 10, at 108–13. 
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reasonable person would question the judge’s impartiality;43 the mo-
vant need not show or even allege actual bias on the part of the chal-
lenged judge.44  When deciding section 455(a) motions, courts ask 
whether a reasonable person aware of all the relevant facts, without 
knowing whether the challenged judge is actually biased, would ques-
tion the judge’s impartiality.45 
b. Financial Interest 
American disqualification law maintains the common law proscrip-
tion against judges presiding over cases in which they have a pecuni-
ary interest because “no man may be a judge in his own case.”46  Sec-
tion 455 provides that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself whenever 
he . . . knows that he . . . has a financial interest in the subject matter 
in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest 
that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceed-
ing.”47  The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.4 similarly cau-
tions that “[a] judge shall not permit . . . financial, or other interests or 
relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment.”48 
 
 43. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Loving Spirit Found., Inc., 392 F.3d 486, 493 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (“Recusal is required when ‘a reasonable and informed observer 
would question the judge’s impartiality.’”(citation omitted)). 
 44. See Clemmons v. Wolfe, 377 F.3d 322, 327 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A]ctual bias is not 
a requisite element under § 455(a).”). 
 45. See Richardson v. Quarterman, 537 F.3d 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2008)  (“[The ques-
tion is whether] ‘a reasonable member of the public, knowing all the circumstances 
involved, would have questions or doubts as to the impartiality of the trial 
judge.’”(citation omitted)); United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764, 775 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“[W]e ask: ‘[w]ould a reasonable person, know-
ing all the facts, conclude that the trial judge’s impartiality could reasonably be ques-
tioned?’”(second alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Union Carbide Corp. v. 
U.S. Cutting Servs., Inc., 782 F.2d 710, 715 (7th Cir. 1986)  (“[T]he issue is whether 
‘an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the facts underlying the 
grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant doubt that justice 
would be done in the case.’” (quoting Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen, 764 F.2d 458, 460 
(7th Cir. 1985))); State v. Perala, 130 P.3d 852, 859 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006); In re 
Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 583 (Pa. 1992); see also McKoski, supra note 23, at 1944–45. 
 46. 1 COKE, supra note 21, at 141a; see Pamela S. Karlan, Judicial Independences, 
95 GEO. L.J. 1041, 1044 (2007) (“One of the most fundamental precepts of due pro-
cess is that no man can be a judge in his own case . . . .”).  For a more extensive dis-
cussion of common law disqualification, see supra note 21. 
 47. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2006). 
 48. ABA CODE, supra note 12, R. 2.4. See generally FLAMM, supra note 10, at 
145–68. 
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While at common law a judge’s financial interest in a case was per 
se disqualifying,49 under the current approach, a judge’s pecuniary in-
terest in a case is a proxy for judicial bias.50  As Rule 2.4 of the ABA 
Model Code indicates, the law is concerned that financially interested 
judges will partially decide cases in favor of those interests.51  The Su-
preme Court confirmed this rationale when it held in Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Co. that “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his 
own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, 
and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.”52  
Courts generally agree that a judge’s interest in a case need not be 
particularly large53 or directly affected by the outcome of the litiga-
tion to be disqualifying.54  Beyond this, how courts should determine 
whether a particular judge’s interest in a case is disqualifying is “the 
source of much disagreement.”55  Some decisions follow a categorical 
approach, holding that a judge is disqualified for any non-negligible 
pecuniary interest.56  Others focus on whether the judge’s interest in 
 
 49. See supra note 21. 
 50. See Leubsdorf, supra note 29, at 247 (“Today, disqualification law is clearly 
directed at the likelihood of warped judgment, with a judge’s financial interest or fa-
milial stake in the case as just one circumstance from which to infer such a likeli-
hood.”); see also Burg, supra note 22, at 1480–82; Note, supra note 28, at 79–80. 
 51. See Del Vecchio v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1373 (7th Cir. 1994) (en 
banc) (“[T]he lure of lucre is a particularly strong motivation, and therefore judges 
ought to be prohibited from presiding over cases in whose outcomes they have a di-
rect financial interest.”). 
 52. 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259 (2009) (emphasis added) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 
10, at 59 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)). 
 53. See, e.g., Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (disqualifying a judge from 
issuing a search warrant where the judge was paid a five dollar fee for each warrant 
issued, but received nothing for warrant applications that he denied); Haas v. County 
of San Bernardino, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341, 358–59 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“[The majority] implies that a due process violation 
would arise from payment of even $10 . . . an amount that today would not cover a 
hearing officer’s parking in many cities.”). 
 54. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) (disqualifying a 
judge from ruling on an appeal from a  punitive damage award where the issue to be 
decided bore on another pending litigation in which the judge was a plaintiff); Yama-
ha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Riney, 21 F.3d 793, 798 (8th Cir. 1994) (“An indirect fi-
nancial interest in the claim raises a question of impartiality.”). But see In re 
Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 201 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Lovaglia, 954 
F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1992)) (“Where a case . . . involves remote, contingent, indirect, 
or speculative interests, disqualification is not required.”).  
 55. Teague v. Bakker, 931 F.2d 259, 261 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 56. See, e.g., In re N.M. Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 620 F.2d 794, 796 (10th Cir. 
1980) (holding that under 28 U.S.C. § 455, direct financial interests are governed by a 
per se rule); In re Estate of Sherburne, 476 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421 (1984) (“[T]he nature 
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the case is substantial, either in terms of his personal finances, or in 
terms of the total value of the case.57  Still, other cases consider 
whether the judge’s interest, however small, stands to be significantly 
impacted by the outcome of the case.58  The general governing princi-
ple seems to be that a “judge should not act in any matter in which he 
has any interest, the probable and natural tendency of which is to cre-
ate a bias in the mind of the judge for or against a party to that mat-
ter.”59 
c. Familial Relationships 
Disqualifying judges for a familial relationship with a party is a log-
ical extension of the financial interest proscription and the principle 
that one cannot judge his own case.60  Just as judges may not remain 
impartial when deciding cases implicating their financial interests, ju-
rists who are closely related to litigants will likely rule from bias ra-
ther than legal principle.61  Section 455 disqualifies a judge where “a 
person within the third degree of relationship to [the judge]: (i) [i]s a 
party to the proceeding . . . (ii) [i]s acting as a lawyer in the proceed-
ing; [or] (iii) [i]s known by the judge to have an interest that could be 
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.”62  The ABA 
Code of Judicial Conduct similarly instructs that “[a] judge shall not 
permit family . . . relationships to influence the judge’s judicial con-
duct or judgment.”63 
 
of the interest required . . . is . . . a pecuniary or property right from which the judge 
might profit or lose.”). 
 57. See, e.g., Huffman v. Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm’n., 344 Ark. 
274, 283 (2001) (considering whether the judge’s interest is sufficiently significant to 
create a reasonable concern that it would lead him to decide the case without the 
requisite impartiality and integrity). 
 58. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(iii) (2006) (disqualifying judges that “have an 
interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.”). 
 59. FLAMM, supra note 10, at 149. 
 60. See id. at 169–70; Paul B. Lewis, Systemic Due Process: Procedural Concepts 
and the Problem of Recusal, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 381, 385 (1990). 
 61. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 839 F.2d 1226, 1229 
(7th Cir. 1988) (stating that “[a] $50 gift from Continental to Judge Shadur would 
disqualify him; a $5,000 gift from Continental to Robert Shadur [the judge’s son] 
could be worth more than $50 to Judge Shadu”); Georgia Power Co. v. Watts, 190 
S.E. 654, 659 (Ga. 1937) (disqualifying a judge who was related to a stockholder in 
the corporate party, even though the judge’s relative was merely interested in the 
outcome of the case, but was not an actual party). 
 62. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5). 
 63. ABA CODE, supra note 12, R. 2.4(B). 
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Disqualification for a familial relationship is governed by a two-
part standard.  First, the movant must demonstrate that the judge has 
a sufficiently close relationship to an interested party.64  The closeness 
of judge-party relationships is typically described by statute in terms 
of “degrees” of relation.65  Judges related to parties in the statutorily 
provided degree or closer may be disqualified, while more distantly 
related judges may preside.  Most jurisdictions calculate degrees of 
relation by tracing the judge and interested party’s lineage to a com-
mon ancestor, and then counting the generations back down to the 
judge or party.66  Each generation by which the judge or interested 
party are removed from their common ancestor constitutes one de-
gree of relation.67  Thus, brothers are first degree relations, a father 
and son, second degree, and uncle and nephew, third degree.68  After 
establishing a close relationship between a judge and party, a movant 
must show that the related party’s interest in the case is substantial 
enough to warrant the judge’s removal.69 
d. Bribes and Gifts 
Judges who accept bribes or gifts from parties are disqualified be-
cause they may be biased in favor of the party who gave the gift.70  
The ABA Code therefore provides that “[a] judge shall not accept 
any gifts, loans, bequests, benefits, or other things of value, if ac-
 
 64. See FLAMM, supra note 10, at 171. 
 65. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5) (third degree); Ala. Code § 12-1-12 (1975) 
(fourth degree); Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 170.1 (West 2010) (same); La. Code Civ. Pro. 
art. 151 (1999) (same); Mont. Code Ann. § 3-1-803 (third degree); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 
14 (McKinney 2001) (sixth degree); Wis. Stat. Ann. 757.19(2) (West 2001) (same). 
 66. See Morton v. Benton Pub. Co., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 824 (Ark. 1987); State v. 
Daughtery, 563 So.2d 1171, 1175 (La. App. 1990). 
 67. See William W. Kilgarlin & Jennifer Bruch, Disqualification and Recusal of 
Judges, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 599, 604 (1986). See generally FLAMM, supra note 10, at 
173–75. 
 68. Some jurisdictions distinguish between blood-relations (relations by consan-
guinity) and relations through marriage (relations by affinity), holding that a judge’s 
relationship to a party through marriage is not disqualifying. See, e.g., Wernowsky v. 
Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 461 N.E.2d 628 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (refusing to disqualify 
a judge from cases involving his brother-in-law); State v. Fullerton, 684 S.W.2d 59, 62 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (judge’s daughter’s marriage to prosecutor’s brother does not 
disqualify the judge from cases tried by that prosecutor because they do not share a 
common ancestor). 
 69. See FLAMM, supra note 10, at 171. 
 70. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 905 (1997) (“A judge who ac-
cepts bribes from a criminal defendant to fix that defendant’s case is ‘biased’ in the 
most basic sense of that word.”); Cartalino v. Washington, 122 F.3d 8, 11 (7th Cir. 
1997) (“[A] bribed judge is biased per se.”). 
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ceptance . . . would appear to a reasonable person to undermine the 
judge’s independence, integrity, or impartiality.”71  A judge is not on-
ly disqualified for receiving gifts from a party to a case then pending 
before him, but also for having accepted a gift from someone who lat-
er becomes involved in litigation before the judge, or for taking a gift 
from someone that is not party to any case before the judge.72 
Judges’ accepting valuable gifts may result in bias, but their accept-
ing “mere social hospitality” does not raise concerns about their im-
partiality, and does not typically warrant removal.73  In deciding 
whether a particular gift is valuable or just an ordinary social conven-
tion, courts consider the monetary value of the gift, the relationship 
between the judge and giver, and local social practices related to gift-
giving.74  As with financial interests and familial relationships, the test 
is not a categorical one; the question is whether the nature of the gift 
raises concerns that the judge will fail to decide the case with com-
plete impartiality.75 
Bias arising from judges’ receiving gifts raises concerns about judg-
es’ receiving judicial election campaign contributions.76  The ABA 
Code of Judicial Conduct explains: 
 
 71. ABA CODE, supra note 12, R. 3.13(A). 
 72. See, e.g., Wallace v. Wallace, 352 So. 2d 1376 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977) (disquali-
fying a judge appointed by Governor George Wallace from hearing subsequent di-
vorce proceedings between Wallace and his wife); State v. Hodges, 305 S.E.2d 278 
(W. Va. 1983) (judge’s accepting gifts from a jury and other court personnel created 
an appearance of bias).  But see In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 205 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“[F]ederal judges routinely receive free copies of books, journals, magazines, and 
other publications that discuss disputed policy issues without any imputation . . . that, 
if they read some of the unsolicited materials, they are thereafter recused on any mat-
ter connected with those issues.”). 
 73. ABA CODE, supra note 12, R. 3.13(B)(3). 
 74. See Charles F. Scott, Reconciling Conflicts in Illinois Judicial Ethics, 19 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 1067, 1069 (1988). 
 75. See id. at 1072–73. 
 76. See Keith Anderson, Ethical Problems of Lawyers and Judges in Election 
Campaigns, 50 A.B.A. J. 819, 823 (1964) (“As long as a judge’s campaign committee 
must accept gifts of money and work from lawyers, there will be gnawing doubts as to 
the freedom from influence and bias.”); Marie A. Failinger, Can a Good Judge Be a 
Good Politician? Judicial Elections from a Virtue Ethics Approach, 70 MO. L. REV. 
433, 494 (2005) (“If the judge felt beholden to particular supporters for their gifts, 
and believed that he was morally obliged to rule in their favor (i.e., to exercise favor-
itism) whenever they appeared before him, we would accuse him of bias or partiali-
ty.”).  For general discussions of problems arising from judicial elections, see Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for Contribution and 
Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI-KENT L. REV. 133 (1998); Charles 
Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43 (2003); Leona C. 
Smoler & Mary A. Stokinger, The Ethical Dilemma of Campaigning for Judicial Of-
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[A] judge plays a role different from that of a legislator or executive 
branch official. Rather than making decisions based upon the ex-
pressed views or preferences of the electorate, a judge makes deci-
sions based upon the law and the facts of every case. Therefore, . . .  
judges and judicial candidates must, to the greatest extent possible, 
be free and appear to be free from political influence and political 
pressure.77 
Recognizing the prevalence of elected judiciaries78 and the need to 
finance judicial election campaigns, the law permits judges to receive 
“reasonable donations” in support of their candidacies.79  The ABA 
Model Code suggests merely that legislatures set a reasonable mone-
tary value beyond which contributions to a judicial campaign would 
appear inappropriate.80  The Supreme Court’s decision in Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Co.,81 where, relying on the Due Process Clause, 
the Court disqualified a state high court judge from deciding a case 
where one party’s CEO had spent three million dollars supporting the 
judge’s election,82 placed some “outer boundaries” on judges’ ability 
 
fice: A Proposed Solution, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 353 (1986); Jon R. Waltz, Some 
Firsthand Observations on the Election of Judges, 63 JUDICATURE 185 (1979); Stuart 
Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign Con-
tributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1988); Grannis, supra note 21. 
 77. ABA CODE, supra note 12, R. 4.1 cmt. 1. 
 78. See State Judicial Elections, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, http://www. 
brennancenter.org/content/section/category/ state_judicial_elections (last visited Feb. 
21, 2012) (“Thirty-nine states elect at least some of their judges”). 
 79. See Williams v. Viswanathan, 65 S.W.3d 685, 687–89 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) 
(“[A] reasonable person must . . . know that our judges have to stand for election on 
a regular basis, that elections cost money, and that money must be raised to conduct 
an effective campaign . . . to require a sitting justice to recuse, something more than 
the mere fact that . . . she prevailed in a contested election and that contributions 
were received must be shown.”); FLAMM, supra note 10, at 245–46 (“[C]ourts have 
generally accepted that as long as a state chooses to select its judges by means of 
popular elections, the judiciary must condone to some extent the collection and ex-
penditure of money for judicial election campaigns.”). 
 80. See ABA CODE, supra note 12, R. 4.4.  Under the ABA Code, however, con-
tributions cannot be solicited by or given to the judicial candidate directly.  Rather, 
solicitations and contributions must be funneled through a campaign committee 
which serves to insulate the candidate from his contributors. See id., R. 4.2(B), 4.4 & 
cmt. 1; FLAMM, supra note 10, at 247; see also Mackenzie v. Super Kids Bargain 
Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1332, 1336 (Fla. 1990) (“[Requiring judicial candidates to solic-
it campaign contributions through a campaign committee] insulates, to the extent 
possible, justices, judges, and judicial candidates from those asked to make contribu-
tions to the campaign. This insulation of judges and judicial candidates reduces the 
possibility of a quid pro quo relationship and serves to avoid the appearance of im-
propriety.”).  
 81. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
 82. See id. at 2257–64. 
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to decide cases involving their own campaign contributors.83  
Caperton’s full impact remains to be seen, however, since the decision 
rested on extreme facts and the Court emphasized that less troubling 
circumstances might not require the judge’s removal.84 
e. Prior Knowledge 
Judges are disqualified for having extrajudicial knowledge about a 
case because special insight into the facts of a case may prevent them 
from impartially weighing parties’ evidence and arguments.85  Federal 
law disqualifies a judge who has “personal knowledge of disputed ev-
identiary facts concerning the proceeding.”86  The ABA Model Code 
similarly provides that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in 
any proceeding in which . . . [t]he judge has . . . personal knowledge of 
facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.”87  Judges are not disquali-
fied, however, where their knowledge about a case is generally avail-
able to the public88 or is the product of judicial proceedings89 because 
 
 83. Id. at 2267 (“The Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of 
judicial disqualifications.”(quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 
(1986))). 
 84. Id. at 2265–66 (“In each [previous recusal] case the Court dealt with extreme 
facts that created an unconstitutional probability of bias that ‘cannot be defined with 
precision.’  Yet . . . [t]he Court was careful to distinguish the extreme facts of the cas-
es before it from those interests that would not rise to a constitutional level.” (cita-
tion omitted)).  For discussions of the potential impact of Caperton on disqualifica-
tion for judges’ accepting campaign contributions, see Bruce A. Green, Fear of the 
Unknown: Judicial Ethics After Caperton, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 229 (2010); James 
Sample, Caperton: Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 293 
(2010); James Sample, Court Reform Enters the Post-Caperton Era, 58 DRAKE L. 
REV. 787 (2010) (noting responses related to funding judicial elections in some states 
following the Caperton decision). 
 85. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136–39 (1955) (disqualifying a judge from 
presiding over contempt proceedings against defendants arising from their conduct in 
one-man grand jury proceedings held by the same judge because the judge could not 
free himself from influence of personal knowledge of what occurred in the grand jury 
session); United States v. Craven, 239 F.3d 91, 102–03 (1st Cir. 2001); Edgar v. K.L., 
93 F.3d 256, 259–62 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); cf. Onishea v. Hopper, 126 F.3d 
1323, 1340 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Sidener, 876 F.2d 1334, 1336 (7th Cir. 
1989) (judge’s impartiality not reasonably questioned when judge had some pri-
or knowledge about the case because the movant did not present any evidence of im-
partiality arising from that knowledge).  
 86. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (2006). 
 87. ABA CODE, supra note 12, R. 2.11. 
 88. See State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238, 247 (Minn. 2005) (“‘[P]ersonal 
knowledge’ pertains to knowledge that arises out of a judge’s private, individual con-
nection to particular facts. . . .  [I]t does not include the vast realm of general 
knowledge that a judge acquires in her day-to-day life as a judge and citizen.”); see 
also United States v. Bonds, 18 F.3d 1327, 1330 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[A] judge should 
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such information is considered conducive to good judicial decision 
making.90 
f. The Due Process Clause 
The Due Process Clause protects people from being deprived of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.91  In part, “[t]he 
Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested 
tribunal,” so that his life, liberty, or property will not be taken based 
on a judge’s biased or incorrect understanding of the law or facts.92  
Due Process also “assures equal application of the law,” and guaran-
tees “that the judge who hears [each litigant’s] case will apply the law 
to him in the same way he applies it to any other party.”93 
While “most matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] not 
rise to a constitutional level,”94 the Supreme Court has found that in 
some circumstances Due Process does mandate a judge’s removal.95  
Judges are constitutionally disqualified when their pecuniary interest 
in a case would “offer a possible temptation to the average man . . . 
 
never be reluctant to inform himself on a general subject matter area, or participate 
in conferences relative to any area for the law, for fear that the sources of infor-
mation might later be assailed as ‘one sided.’”).  
 89. See, e.g., United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 405 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding 
judge was not disqualified from presiding over a case despite his concurrently presid-
ing over a related action because the judge’s knowledge about the matter came from 
a judicial, not extrajudicial, source); United States v. Flowers, 818 F.2d 464, 468–69 
(6th Cir. 1987) (finding that the Canons of Judicial Conduct did not require the dis-
trict judge to recuse due to his personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts be-
cause the information did not come from an extrajudicial source).  
 90. See generally Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548–53 (1994). 
 91. U.S. CONST. amends. V,  XIV. 
 92. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980). 
 93. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 776 (2002); see also Bigby 
v. Dretke, 402 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he cornerstone of the American ju-
dicial system is the right to a fair and impartial process.  Therefore, any judicial of-
ficer incapable of presiding in such a manner violates the due process rights of the 
party who suffers the resulting effects of that judicial officer’s bias.”).  See generally 
Gerard J. Clark, Caperton’s New Right to Independence in Judges, 58 DRAKE L. 
REV. 661, 668–69 (2010). 
 94. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948). 
 95. See generally FLAMM, supra note 10, at 31–33; Terri R. Day, Buying Justice: 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Campaign Dollars, Mandatory Recusal and Due Process, 
28 MISS. C. L. REV. 359, 366–70 (2009); Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Disqualification 
in the Aftermath of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 247, 
249–55 (2010); Grannis, supra note 21, at 391–96; Benjamin A. Levin, Note, 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.: Something is Rotten in the State of West Virgin-
ia—A Common-Law Approach to Constitutional Judicial Disqualification, 69 MD. L. 
REV. 637, 640–53 (2010). 
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not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.”96  A judge who becomes 
heavily involved with the parties or subject matter of a case may also 
be constitutionally disqualified.  For example, in In re Murchison97 
the Court held a judge may not preside over the criminal prosecution 
of a defendant that the judge had indicted while serving as a one-man 
grand jury.98  Similarly, in Offutt v. United States,99 the Court ruled a 
judge was constitutionally disqualified from a case being tried by an 
attorney who leveled “personal attacks or innuendoes” against the 
judge.100 
Most recently, the Court expanded constitutional disqualification 
by holding that Justice Brett Benjamin was disqualified from hearing 
an appeal where the appellant’s CEO had spent three million dollars 
to support Benjamin’s election to the bench several years earlier.101  
Caperton established that Due Process does not “require proof of ac-
tual bias,”102 and that the relevant question is whether the circum-
stances pose “such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the prac-
tice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be 
 
 96. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972); see Aetna Life Ins. Co. 
v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 827–29 (1986) (constitutionally disqualifying a state appellate 
judge from an appeal because the judge was a party to pending litigation that turned 
on one of the questions presented to the appellate court for review); Tumey v. Ohio, 
273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (“[I]t certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment and de-
prives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or 
property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal, sub-
stantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.”); see also 
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579–81 (1973) (constitutionally disqualifying a state 
optometry board composed solely of members of one professional association from 
license revocation proceedings brought against optometrists employed by a compet-
ing optometry association). 
 97. 349 U.S. 133, 139 (1955). 
 98. Id. at 137 (“It would be very strange if our system of law permitted a judge to 
act as a grand jury and then try the very persons accused as a result of his investiga-
tions. . . .  A single ‘judge-grand jury’ is even more a part of the accusatory process 
than an ordinary lay grand juror. Having been a part of that process a judge cannot 
be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of 
those accused. While he would not likely have all the zeal of a prosecutor, it can cer-
tainly not be said that he would have none of that zeal. Fair trials are too important a 
part of our free society to let prosecuting judges be trial judges of the charges they 
prefer.”). But see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 54–55 (1975) (holding an adminis-
trative agency tasked with licensing physicians is not disqualified from adjudicating 
license-revocation proceedings simply because it also investigates claims of physician 
misconduct and initiates such proceedings itself). 
 99. 348 U.S. 11 (1954). 
 100. Id. at 14; see also Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925). 
 101. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257–59 (2009); see 
also supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
 102. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263. 
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adequately implemented.”103  Reasoning that “fears of bias arise 
when . . . a man chooses the judge in his own cause,”104 the Court con-
cluded that Justice Benjamin would feel a debt of gratitude to the ap-
pellant’s CEO for the latter’s extraordinary efforts on behalf of his 
election campaign, and that his presiding over the case would there-
fore lead to a “possible temptation . . . not to hold the balance nice, 
clear, and true.”105 
B. The Traditional Jewish Law of Judicial Disqualification and 
Recusal 
This Section reviews the traditional Jewish law approach to judicial 
disqualification.  Because halachic disqualification jurisprudence is 
grounded in the Jewish law’s unique conception of the role of courts 
and judges in the litigation process, Section I.B.1. begins by providing 
appropriate jurisprudential context for the substance of Jewish 
recusal doctrine.  Building on this theoretical framework, Section 
I.B.2 lays out the basic doctrines governing judges’ removal in the 
halachic system. 
1. Litigation, Courts, and Judges in the Halachic System: The 
Jurisprudential Aims of Jewish Disqualification Law 
Halachic recusal law serves principally to preserve the integrity of 
courts’ institutional role in the adjudicative process, to protect judges’ 
professional integrity, and to encourage judges to be personally 
integrious.  Courts’ institutional role and judges’ professional and 
personal duties stem, in turn, from the Torah law’s goal of encourag-
ing the moral ennoblement of mankind through other-focused self-
transcendence. 
Jewish tradition characterizes God as performing chessed, selfless 
actions calculated to impart good unto others.106  God expressed His 
characteristic chessed by creating Man “in His own image,”107 by en-
 
 103. Id. (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)). 
 104. Id. at 2265. 
 105. Id. at 2262–64 (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532). 
 106. See AVOS D’RAV NOSSON 4:5 (“The world was initially created with nothing 
but chessed, as it says, For I [God] have said: The world will be built with chessed.”) 
(internal quotations omitted); R. MOSHE CHAIM LUZZATTO (1707–1746), 1 DERECH 
HASHEM 2:1 (“Behold, the very purpose of [God’s] creating [the world] was to confer 
from His goodness unto his creations.”).  All translations of Hebrew-language 
sources in this Note are my own unless otherwise indicated. 
 107. Genesis 1:27; cf. R. ELIYAHU DESSLER, 1 MICHTAV M’ELIYAHU 32 (1997) 
(quoting Genesis 1:27) (“The power of giving is the greatest of God’s characteristics . 
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dowing him with God-like creativity and free will,108 and by directing 
him to use these abilities to harness the natural world as a means of 
performing chessed himself.109  God fashioned a chessed-based uni-
verse to benefit His creations,110 and Man can emulate God by choos-
ing to utilize his own creative potential to do chessed for others,111 
thereby becoming truly human.112  The Talmud thus teaches that by 
suppressing his natural self-centeredness and instead using his talents 
for chessed in accordance with God’s will Man becomes “a partner 
with God in the ongoing work of Creation.”113 
 
. . and with this characteristic He created Man, as it says: ‘In God’s image was Man 
created . . . .’”). 
 108. See R. CHIZKIYAH B. MANOACH (d. 13th century), CHEZKUNI, GENESIS 1:26 
(s.v. Na’aseh Adam) (explaining that just as God controls the heavens, so too, is Man 
empowered to rule over the earth); R. OVADIAH SFORNO (d. 1550), COMMENTARY ON 
THE PENTATEUCH, GENESIS 1:27 (s.v. B’tzelem Elohim) (reasoning that Man’s like-
ness to God lies in his ability to exercise free-will to choose between good and evil).  
 109. See Genesis 1:28; Genesis 2:15 (“And God set a goal for [Adam and Eve], and 
God said to them: ‘Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth, and conquer it . . . And 
God took Man and place and set him in the Garden of Eden to develop and guard 
it.”); NACHMANIDES (1194–1270), COMMENTARY ON THE PENTATEUCH, GENESIS 1:28 
(s.v. v’kivshuha); see also R. SAMSON RAPHAEL HIRSCH, THE NINETEEN LETTERS 62 
(Joseph Elias, trans., 2d. ed. 1995)  (“God created [Man] . . . to be, so to speak, a 
‘partner in the work of creation,’ able to direct the forces that make up our world and 
free to choose how to use this power.” (quoting BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SHABBOS 
10a)). 
 110. See supra note 106. 
 111. HIRSCH, supra note 109, at 64 (“Since God’s world is built . . . on loving kind-
ness, man’s duty to follow God and imitate His ways is discharged, in the first place, 
by doing acts of kindness.”). 
 112. See R. YEHUDAH LOEW (1525–1609), DERECH CHAIM 2:1 (stating that Man 
makes himself truly human by choosing to govern himself with his intellect and 
awareness of his God-given purpose instead of with his base physicality); R. SAMSON 
RAPHAEL HIRSCH, HOREB: A PHILOSOPHY OF JEWISH LAWS AND OBSERVANCES 247–
48 (Dayan Dr. Isidore Grunfeld, transl., 7th ed. 2002) [hereinafter HIRSCH, HOREB] 
(“[T]he highest goal you can reach is to become a chasid, that is to say, a person who 
lives entirely, with everything he has, for the welfare of others, who is nothing for 
himself and everything for others.”); Dayan Dr. Isidore Grunfeld, Introduction, in 
HOREB, supra, at p. xliii [hereinafter Grunfeld, Introduction] (“[To perfect the world 
through the reign of God]—this is the aim, the striving for which makes us into pious 
souls.” (quoting R. SAMSON RAPHAEL HIRSCH, 3 GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN 449 (1912) 
(Ger.))). 
 113. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SHABBOS 10a; see Michael J. Broyde, Rights and Du-
ties in the Jewish Tradition, in CONTRASTS IN AMERICAN AND JEWISH LAW xxix 
(Daniel Pollack ed., 2001) (“[Jewish law] is predicated on the duty to imitate the Di-
vine”); see also BABYLONAIN TALMUD, SHABBOS 133b (“Just as God is merciful and 
gracious, so should you act mercifully and graciously.”); BABYLONIAN TALMUD, 
SOTAH 14a; MAIMONIDES (1135–1204), SEFER HAMITZVOS, Positive Commandment 
8. See generally R. MOSHE CORDOVERO (1522–1570), TOMER DEVORAH, ch. 5–6 
(discussing Man’s duty to emulate God’s characteristics). 
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Torah law, which governs individual, communal, and national Jew-
ish life,114 teaches Jews how to fulfill this chessed-imperative in prac-
tice.115  Jews fulfill their imitatio dei obligation by transcending their 
baser instincts and choosing to act in accordance with the Torah’s 
chessed-oriented legal norms instead.116  The Jewish law system thus 
functions primarily as a means of enabling its adherents to develop 
their humaneness through self-transcendence, by teaching them how 
and instructing them to choose to adopt God’s chessed-focused will as 
their own.117  The Midrash thus posits that “[t]he Torah’s laws were 
given to the Jews for the sole purpose of refining their social interac-
tions.”118 
 
 114. See Grunfeld, Introduction, supra note 112, at xlvii (“What the Torah desires 
to regulate is . . . the whole of human existence—man’s sensual impulses, his needs 
and desires, his individual life as well as that of his family, society, and State.” (quot-
ing R. SAMSON RAPHAEL HIRSCH, 1 GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN 83 (1912) (Ger.))). 
 115. See R. SAMSON RAPHAEL HIRSCH, 2 COLLECTED WRITINGS 207 (Marc Breur 
et al. eds., 2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter HIRSCH, COLLECTED WRITINGS] (“The Law [of 
the Torah] . . . establishes God’s will as the motive and measure of man’s ennoble-
ment.”); HOREB, supra note 112, at 219–20 (“[God] has announced His justice to the 
world [in the laws of the Torah] so that you may freely submit to Him in consequence 
of His command to you . . . and so that you may be just.”); Steven H. Resnicoff, Au-
tonomy in Jewish Law—In Theory and Practice, 24 J. L. & RELIGION 507, 508–09 
(2008) (“Jewish law assumes that there is a God, that God is morally perfect, that 
God wants human beings to act morally, and that God communicated to the Jewish 
people specific and general moral rules (Torah precepts).”).  
 116. See LAW, POLITICS, AND MORALITY IN JUDAISM 8 (Michael Walzer ed., 2008) 
(“If [man] could only fathom the inner intent of the law, he would realize that the es-
sence of the true divine religion lies in the deeper meaning of its positive and nega-
tive precepts, every one of which will aid man in his striving after perfection . . . .” 
(quoting MAIMONIDES, LETTER TO YEMEN); Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and 
Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ideology: An Imaginary Conversation, 3 J. 
CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 1, 17 (1989) (“[The Jewish legal system] is based on the value of 
encouraging individuals to expand their narrow self centeredness and reach out to a 
level of consideration of others: self-transcendence as a key form of moral educa-
tion.”); see also Moshe Silberg, Law and Morals in Jewish Jurisprudence, 75 HARV. 
L. REV. 306 (1961).   
 117. This concept is illustrated by the following Mishnaic teaching. “R. Chanina b. 
Akashia said: God, blessed be He, wanted to provide benefit to the Jews.  He there-
fore gave them a multitude of Torah commandments, as it says: ‘For the sake of up-
holding His justness, God made his teachings [the laws of the Torah] numerous and 
glorious.’” BABYLONIAN TALMUD, MAKKOS 23b (quoting ISAIAH 42:21).  R. Shlomo 
Yitzchaki, an eleventh century French scholar and author of the preeminent com-
mentary on the Talmud explained that the multitude of halachic directives benefit 
adherents to the Torah because they provide additional opportunities for man to 
suppress his base desires and accept God’s will as his own. See R. SHLOMO 
YITZCHAKI, RASHI to MAKKOS 23b (s.v. L’zakos es Yisrael) [hereinafter, YITZCHAKI, 
RASHI]. 
 118. MIDRASH RABAH, LEVITICUS 13:3. 
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Moral ennoblement through self-transcendence requires other-
referentiality, the adoption of an externally-dictated rather than in-
ternally-devised value system.  While the implementation of even an 
objective standard of conduct necessitates subjective interpretation, 
by reposing ultimate authority in some other, morally superior au-
thority an individual can minimize the degree to which seemingly self-
transcendent actions are really self-indulgent appeals to his own vani-
ty.  As a moralizing medium, therefore, the Torah relies more on the 
process of Jews’ choosing to subjugate their naturally self-referential 
instincts in favor of God’s own value judgments as revealed in the To-
rah.119  When one performs a good act because his own conscious dic-
tates he do so, his conduct stems from self-referential instinct; when 
he does that same act because it is commanded by an external moral 
authority, however, the performance becomes a self-transcending, 
moralizing act.120  The Talmud thus teaches, “one who is commanded 
to act and acts is greater than one who acts similarly but of his own 
accord,”121 and “[o]ne may do much or one may do little [in service of 
God], it is all equal provided each one directs and orders his heart 
with reference to Heaven.”122    
Interpersonal disputes challenge the halacha’s other-referential 
character and the Torah’s self-transcending, moralizing ideal.  The 
other-referential acceptance of Torah law in traditionally religious 
matters governing Man’s relationship with God is unproblematic.  
Jews study the halacha, transcend their base instincts by self-applying 
the Torah’s chessed-focused laws to their lives, and consult their rab-
bis when they are unsure about what the law requires.123  The moral-
 
 119. See Grunfeld, Introduction, supra note 112, at lxxvii (“If a person makes the 
will of God his own will, and fights” his natural self-centered desires and impulses 
“he develops his moral power although his action is not the consequence of his own 
moral discernment and of a purpose recognized by himself.  For moral power and 
one’s own moral discernment do not depend on one another.” (quoting R. SAMSON 
RAPHAEL HIRSCH, ERSTE MITTEILUNGEN 7 (1838) (Ger.))). 
 120. Aharon Lichtenstein, Communal Governance, Lay and Rabbinic: An Over-
view, in RABBINIC AND LAY COMMUNAL AUTHORITY 20 (Suzanne Last Stone & 
Robert S. Hirt eds., 2006) (“[A]ction in response to the halakhic call is superior to the 
same act voluntarily undertaken.”). 
 121. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, AVODA ZARA 3a. 
 122. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BERACHOS 17a; see also MISHNA TORAH, The Laws of 
Kings 8:11 [hereinafter MISHNA TORAH] (“It is essential that the . . . Laws be obeyed 
as commandments of God and not as the result of man’s own speculative reasoning 
and moral discernment.”). 
 123. See MARC D. ANGEL, LOVING TRUTH AND PEACE: THE GRAND RELIGIOUS 
WORLDVIEW OF RABBI BENTZION UZIEL 83 (1999) (“One of the vital functions of the 
rabbi was to serve as a posek, a decisor of Jewish law.”); JOSEPH S. OZAROWSKI, TO 
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izing, other-referential acceptance of the halacha in interpersonal 
conflicts is far more problematic.  Disputing parties often reasonably 
disagree about how to “halachicly” resolve their disagreement.  Fur-
ther, a solution adopting one party’s view would negate the intended 
moralizing impact of halachic practice because such a resolution, even 
if substantively correct, would be self-referential, grounded in base 
instinct rather than a self-transcending, reasoned acceptance of God’s 
will. 
This problem is remedied through adjudicatory procedures where-
by Jewish law courts, or batei din (singular: beis din), provide parties 
with other-referential assessments of how their cases should be re-
solved under Torah law.124  Batei din hear and evaluate parties’ 
claims, investigate facts, deliberate, and issue rulings elucidating their 
views of litigants’ Torah-based responsibilities.125  As adjudicatory in-
stitutions, Jewish law courts function as disinterested third-parties 
that are able provide other-referential halachic rulings precisely be-
 
WALK IN GOD’S WAYS: JEWISH PASTORAL PERSPECTIVES ON ILLNESS AND BEREAVE-
MENT 54 (2004). 
 124. For an extensive explanation of the self-transcendence facilitating role of Jew-
ish law courts, see R. Jospeh B. Soloveitchik, The Role of the Judge, in SHIRUREI 
HARAV: A CONSPECTUS OF THE PUBLIC LECTURES OF RABBI JOSEPH B. 
SOLOVEITCHIK 81 (Joseph Epstein ed., 1974). This conception of the role of litiga-
tion in Jewish law finds support in the halachic doctrine of self-help.  The Torah gen-
erally prohibits individuals from using self-help to resolve monetary disputes with 
others.  A party may, however, employ self-help to enforce his legal claims on anoth-
er when it is legally and factually clear that the self-helper is in the right and that he 
would certainly prevail if he resolved the matter in court. See generally R. YOSEF 
KARO (1488–1575), SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 4:1 [hereinafter KARO, 
SHULCHAN ARUCH]. This rule indicates that the general prohibition on self-help is 
not grounded in the need to maintain social order by proscribing vigilantism, but is 
instead premised on the fact that in most cases the facts and law are not entirely 
clear, and that, therefore, neither parties’ self-interested view of its Torah obligations 
under the circumstances is likely to be entirely other-referential and moralizing.  Un-
der such circumstances, self-help based on a party’s self-referential understanding of 
the halacha would undermine the Torah’s moralizing purpose. When the facts and 
law unavoidably support one disputant over the other, however, the party in the right 
may enforce the law himself, because the obviousness of the result permits his act of 
self-help to be other-referential and moralizing.  The law of self-help thus suggests 
that halachic adjudication serves to resolve legal disputes in a moralizing manner in 
cases where each litigants’ position is a product of its self-interested interpretation of 
the Torah, rather than servile acceptance of God’s value judgment. See SHIMON 
ETTINGER & HANINA BEN-MENAHEM, SELECTED TOPICS IN JEWISH LAW: SELF-HELP 
IN JEWISH LAW 15 (1988); Yedidya Dinari, Self Help in Jewish Law, 4 DINE ISRAEL 
91 (1973).   
 125. See Silberg, supra note 116, at 306 (“[L]itigation in Jewish law was in the na-
ture of a common request for clarification by people willing to perform their duty 
once made known to them.”); Suzanne Last Stone, Judaism and Civil Society, in 
LAW, POLITICS, AND MORALITY IN JUDAISM, supra note 116, at 20. 
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cause they are not parties to the cases they decide.126  From this van-
tage, batei din can deliver what litigants cannot furnish for them-
selves: an external, other-referential evaluation of what the halacha 
requires in a particular dispute.127  Previously self-focused litigants 
can consequently transcend their personal priorities by adopting a 
court’s disinterested judgment as their own standard, thereby morally 
ennobling their conduct consonant with Torah ideals.  The Torah pre-
serves this institutional arrangement by disqualifying judges whose 
connection to a case is incompatible with the court’s third-party char-
acter.  Judges who are in effect parties to a case—such as those who 
are financially interested in the outcome or are related to a party128—
are legally incapable of proceeding in a judicial capacity and are dis-
qualified because their connection to the matter prevents them from 
rendering other-referential, moralizing halachic decisions.129  Such lit-
igant-judges literally cease being jurists,130 and thus, any measures 
they take under the guise of judicial proceedings are ex post void.131 
 
 126. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BAVA BASRA 43a; KARO, SHULCHAN ARUCH, su-
pra note 124, at 7:9, 7:12, 37:1. 
 127. See R. SAMSON RAPHAEL HIRSCH, COMMENTARY ON THE PENTATEUCH, 
DEUTERONOMY 1:17 (s.v. Ki Hamishpat L’Eilokim Hu) [hereinafter HIRSCH, COM-
MENTARY] (“In giving judgment [the judge] is engaged in God’s work. . . .  [The To-
rah’s] [j]ustice shapes a humane way of life and gives it the form intended by the Cre-
ator at the Creation; for the whole purpose of man’s creation was so that he should 
freely realize God’s Will, and only for this purpose did the Creator place man in His 
world.”); see also Bush, supra note 117, at 17–18; Silberg, supra note 116, at 306. 
 128. See infra Part I.B.2.a.ii.; see also infra Part I.B.2.a.iii (disqualification for re-
ceiving bribes or gifts); Part I.B.2.a.iv. (disqualification for having previously issued 
an advisory opinion). 
 129. See RASHI to BAVA BASRA 43a (s.v. Noga’im B’eidusan Hein).  Rashi dis-
cusses financially interested witnesses who wish to testify on behalf of their interest, 
writing that since “if any plaintiff were to collect a judgment against the [property in 
question] they [the witnesses] would lose, it comes out that they would be testifying 
in their own case.” Id.  This comment, and other halachic discussions relating to wit-
ness disqualification, also applies to judicial recusal, because under Jewish law, judges 
are disqualified in every instance where a similarly situated witness would be ineligi-
ble to testify. See MISHNAH, NIDDAH 6:4 (“All those disqualified from testifying are 
disqualified from judging, but there are those that are disqualified from judging that 
are nevertheless qualified to testify.”); BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 27b; see 
also supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text. 
 130. See R. YONASAN EIBESHUTZ, TUMIN 37:1 and sources cited therein (reasoning 
that a financially interested witness or judge cannot really be considered disqualified 
because, on account of their stake in the case, they were never “within the legal defi-
nition of a witness” or judge). 
 131. See R. MOSHE ISSERELES (1520–1572), DARCHEI MOSHE [hereinafter 
ISSERELES, DARCHEI MOSHE] to R. YOSEF KARO, BAIS YOSEF [hereinafter KARO, 
BAIS YOSEF], Choshen Mishpat 33:1 (citing R. MORDECHAI B. HILLEL ASHKENAZI 
(thirteenth century), RAV MORDECHAI [hereinafter MORDECHAI] to SANHEDRIN § 
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The professional responsibilities of Jewish law judges, or dayanim 
(singular: dayan), extend beyond maintaining the courts’ requisite 
third-party vantage.  A dayan’s duty is to, as the Talmud puts it, “is-
sue true and honest judgments.”132  “True” decisions are substantively 
correct applications of Torah law norms to the facts of each case,133 
and “honest” rulings are conclusions motivated solely by a judges’ 
commitment to uphold and enforce the halacha, unadulterated by ex-
tralegal considerations or personal value judgments.134  To help 
dayanim fulfill their charge,  Jewish law obligates judges to voluntari-
ly recuse from cases that implicate their personal biases.135  Unlike in-
terested dayanim who are disqualified because they cease being ju-
rists,136 potentially partial judges are legally competent to preside and 
are only obligated to recuse ex ante out of concern that despite their 
best efforts they will fail to rule “truthfully and honestly.”137  There-
fore, if a dayan wrongfully presides over and rules on a matter that 
implicates his biases, the decision—if substantively correct—will 
stand, whatever his failure to recuse might say about the judge’s per-
sonal and professional integrity.138 
 
698) (“All those [judges or witnesses] that are disqualified, even after they rule or tes-
tify [accurately] in a case, their rulings and testimony are void.”). 
 132. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SHABBOS 10a. 
 133. See DEUTERONOMY 16:19 (“Do not twist the law.”); TOSFOS to BAVA BASRA 
8b (s.v. Din). 
 134. See TOSFOS to MEGILLAH 15b (s.v. Zeh); BEIS YOSEF, Choshen Mishpat 1:2 
(s.v. V’zehu Kavanas Raboseinu); R. MOSHE DOVID ASHKENAZI (1774–1814), BE’ER 
SHEVA, Sanhedrin 111b; HAGAOS V’HEAROS to R. YAAKOV B. ASHER (D. 1343), 
ARBAH TURIM [hereinafter ARBAH TURIM], Choshen Mishpat 1:17 and sources cited 
therein (Machon Yerushalayim 1993); see also HIRSCH, HOREB, supra note 112, at 
266 (“The duty of the judge is to be not more, but also not less, than the mere instru-
ment of the law, and thus hold himself completely above case and party.”).  A judge’s 
injecting personal considerations into his judicial decision making process—even if 
these extralegal motivations do not alter the substantive correctness of the ruling—
undermines the other-referential character of the decision, negating the quintessen-
tial moralizing purpose of halachic adjudication.  Id. 
 135. See infra notes 176–77 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text. 
 137. See R. YEHOSHUA FALK, SEFER MEIROS EINAYIM 33:1 [hereinafter SMA] 
(“Judgment is dependent on [the judge’s] reasoning, and his thought processes may 
be changed on account of [the judge’s] love or hatred [for a litigant], even without 
malicious intentions.”). 
 138. See MISHNA TORAH, The Laws of Sanhedrin 23:6 (“It is prohibited for a per-
son to judge a party he loves . . . [so too,] one may not judge a person he hates . . . “).  
Commentators point to Maimonides’ decision to write that a biased judge is “prohib-
ited” (assur) rather than “disqualified” (pasul) from judging as indicative of his hold-
ing that a biased judge is only initially prohibited from deciding cases implicating his 
personal preferences, but that if he rules correctly in such cases the decision is legally 
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Dayanim must also maintain exceedingly high standards of person-
al integrity in excess of what may be required to rule truthfully and 
honestly.139  The Torah prescribes the inherent equality of all people, 
distinguishing between them only in terms of their differing rights and 
obligations under the law.140  Dayanim are obligated to affirm and ac-
tualize this concept by treating litigants equally, demonstrating that 
plaintiff, defendant, judge, and court are brought to together and hold 
power over one another only by virtue of their collective moralizing 
commitment to abide by God’s law.141 Additionally, judges, like all 
Jews, must constantly strive to suppress their base instincts and inter-
nalize as their own God’s chessed-focused value judgments as ex-
pressed in the halacha.142  In support of this lofty vision or judges’ 
personal obligations, Jewish law demands that judicial candidates 
possess a wide array of meritorious character traits, including humili-
ty, aversion to wealth and luxury, a love of truth and justice, a love of 
people, and a good reputation.143 
2. Grounds for Disqualification and Recusal in Jewish Law 
This Section examines the substantive halacha governing the re-
moval of judges.  Subpart I.B.2.a. discusses instances in which a judge 
is disqualified because his connection to a case is incompatible with 
the institutional role of the beis din in the adjudication process.  Sub-
part I.B.2.b. then reviews grounds for which a dayan may be ex ante 
prohibited from presiding and obliged to voluntarily recuse.  Subpart 
I.B.2.c. concludes by discussing the Jewish law judges’ extrajudicial 
obligations to develop their personal integrity by affording equal 
treatment and consideration to every litigant. 
 
valid after the fact. See, e.g., BAIS YOSEF, Choshen Mishpat 7:8 (s.v. Ein Hadayan); 
R. YOSEF ISSER, SHA’AR MISHPAT 7:2. 
 139. See MISHNAH TORAH, The Laws of Sanhedrin 2:7; infra Part I.B.2.c. 
 140. See R. YITZCHAK ARAMA (1420–1494), AKEIDAS YITZCHAK, Numbers 1:2; 
Emanuel Rackman, Judaism and Equality, in JUDAISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 33–34 
(Milton Ridvas Konvitz ed., 2001). 
 141. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 17:1–11; infra notes 195–196 and 
accompanying text. 
 142. See ARBAH TURIM, Choshen Mishpat 1.  For a discussion of the parallel prin-
ciple that the Torah views all Jews as judges, constantly evaluating and deciding the 
proper halachic course of conduct in every situation in which they find themselves, 
and expected to always conduct themselves in accordance with the highest standards 
of judicial integrity, see Hon. Rick Haselton, Of Judging and Judaism, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 483, 489–90 (2011). 
 143. See ARBAH TURIM, Choshen Mishpat 7:15; see also MISHNAH TORAH, The 
Laws of Sanhedrin 2:7. 
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a. Disqualification to Maintain the Institutional Integrity of the 
Court 
The Torah preserves courts’ institutional role as third-party adjudi-
cators capable of providing litigants with other-referential, moralizing 
evaluations of their halachic duties by disqualifying judges when their 
connection to a case renders them parties to the litigation, undermin-
ing the court’s fundamental raison d’etre.144  This Subpart discusses 
the rules governing these disqualifying relationships, which include 
financial interests, close familial relationships, receiving bribes or 
gifts, and issuing advisory opinions. 
i. Financial Interest 
The Talmud disqualifies a resident judge from a case brought by 
his town’s communal charity fund to collect an unpaid pledge,145  and 
from an action brought by his community against a defendant accused 
of stealing the town’s Torah scroll.146  The resident dayan is legally in-
capable of ruling, because in both cases he has a financial interest in 
the outcome of the suit.147 In the Torah scroll case, the judge is a party 
to the litigation because all Jews must hear public Torah readings 
thrice weekly,148 and because the town’s citizens—including the 
judge—will have to collectively purchase a new scroll if they fail to 
 
 144. See supra notes 126–131 and accompanying text. 
 145. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BAVA BASRA 43a (“If one says, ‘Give a sum of 
money to the people of my city,’ the case may not be judged by judges of that city, 
nor may evidence be presented based on the testimony of residents of that city.”).  
For a discussion of the nature of communal charity funds as institutions and the ca-
pacity of these institutions to bring legal suits in court, see PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH 
LAW 161–62 (Menachem Elon ed., 2007). 
 146. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BAVA BASRA 43a (“The residents of a city from 
whom a Torah scroll was stolen; the case may not be judged by judges of that city, 
and evidence may not be presented based on the testimony of the residents of that 
city.”).  For an overview of the legal remedies for alleged robbery or theft, see 
SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 359–78; see also Theft and Robbery, JEWISH 
VIRTUAL LIBRARY, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_ 
0019_0_19785.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2011). 
 147. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BAVA BASRA 43a. 
 148. According to the Talmud, the prophet Ezra enacted ten new laws when he led 
the Jewish people from exile in Persia to resettle their lands in Israel. See generally 
Ezra 1–4.  Among these measures was that the Torah should be read publicly on 
Mondays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, so that the masses should not pass three days 
without Torah study. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BAVA KAMMA 82a; 2 MENACHEM 
ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 556 n.47 (Benard Auerbach & 
Melvin S. Sykes trans., 1994) (1988). 
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recover against the alleged thief.149  Likewise, in the charity fund case, 
the judge is disqualified because the residents of every community are 
obligated to support their poor,150 and recovering the bequest would 
offset the charity burden otherwise born by the town’s residents, in-
cluding the judge.151 
According to the halachic codes,152  dayanim are disqualified for di-
rect and indirect financial stakes in cases pending before them,153 as 
well as for even small non-pecuniary interests in such matters.154  Be-
 
 149. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BAVA BASRA 43a; 1 EMANUEL QUINT, A RE-
STATEMENT OF RABBINIC CIVIL LAW 63 n.42 (1990); see also SHULCHAN ARUCH, 
Choshen Mishpat 163:1 (“Members of the community may legally compel each other 
. . . to purchase a Torah scroll.”). 
 150. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, Yoreh Deah 256:1 (“[The community of] every city in 
which there are Jews is obligated to appoint charity fund trustees who are well-
known and trustworthy in order that they may go and collect from each member of 
the community the amount that has been fixed for him to contribute [to the public 
fund].”);  R. MOSHE ISSERLES, REMA [hereinafter ISSERLES, REMA] to SHULCHAN 
ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 163:1; R. YECHIEL MICHEL EPSTEIN (1829–1908) ARUCH 
HASHULCHAN, Choshen Mishpat 163:1.  For a more extensive discussion of local Jew-
ish communities’ obligation to support their poor and the manner in which this bur-
den devolves on the members of that community see generally AARON LEVINE, ECO-
NOMICS & JEWISH LAW: HALAKHIC PERSPECTIVES 107–37 (1987). 
 151. See RASHBAM (Samuel ben Meir c. 1085–c. 1158) to BAVA BASRA 43a (s.v. 
D’keivan D’ravach); BAIS YOSEF, Choshen Mishpat 7:17, 18 (s.v. U’mah Shekasuv 
V’afilu);  R. YOEL SIRKIS (1561–1640), BAYIS CHADASH [hereinafter BACH], 
Choshen Mishpat 7:17; Quint, supra note 149, at 62 n.42. 
 152. See MISHNAH TORAH, The Laws of Evidence 15:2–3; ARBAH TURIM, Choshen 
Mishpat 7:16–17; SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 7:12. 
 153. Compare SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 37:1 (ruling that where two 
partners own a single property and a suit is brought against one of the partners alleg-
ing that the whole property had been stolen from the plaintiff and illegally sold to the 
partner-defendant, the non-party partner is disqualified from judging the case) and  
SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 37:4 (ruling that a debtor holding a debt in 
partnership with another party is disqualified from judging a case brought by the 
creditor against only the partner for repayment of the loan) with SHULCHAN ARUCH, 
Choshen Mishpat 37:11 (holding that where A holds a note of credit against B and 
conveys the note to C, B is disqualified from judging an action seeking to invalidate 
the conveyance since he may prefer to be indebted to A over C, or vice versa) and 
SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 37:15 (ruling that where A sells property to B 
without a guarantee and C subsequently brings a suit against B to recover title to the 
property, A is disqualified from judging the case since he may prefer that the proper-
ty remain with B so that his own creditors can attach the property to pay debts owed 
to them by A). 
 154. See, e.g., R. ASHER B. YECHIEL, RESPONSA ROSH 6:25 (disqualifying a judge 
from deciding a case involving a bequest of books and lamps to the synagogue the 
judge frequented, even though the members of the congregation would be under no 
obligation to purchase these items themselves if the bequest was invalidated); R. 
YOM TOV ASEVILLI (RITVA) (1250–1330), NOVELLAE TO BAVA BASRA 43a, n.62 
(Mossad Harav Kook, ed.) (s.v. Ibayis Eimah) (quoting R. MEIR ABULAFIA (1170–
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cause they cannot expressly provide for every kind and degree of in-
terest that a judge may have in a case, the codes give dayanim discre-
tion to determine whether a particular interest is disqualifying, but 
caution judges to voluntarily recuse themselves in doubtful circum-
stances:  
These matters are dependent on the mind of the judge and the 
strength of his understanding of the roots of the legal issues and of 
his knowledge of causation; he must delve deeply to determine 
whether this [judge] has any interest in this judgment, even through 
a far-off and circuitous route.155 
ii. Familial Relationships 
Dayanim are disqualified from deciding cases involving their close 
relatives because a court presided over by a litigant’s relative cannot 
maintain its position as a third-party institution.156  Relationships be-
tween judges and litigants are reckoned in terms of degree157 by trac-
ing the lineage of both the judge and party to a common ancestor and 
then counting the number of generations each one is removed from 
their common progenitor, each generation counting as one degree.158  
A father and son or two brothers are thus termed “first-first” rela-
tions;159 a nephew and uncle, “first-second” relations; and first cousins 
 
1244), RESPONSA RAMAH § 159) (holding a judge is disqualified for even non-
pecuniary interests in the outcome of a case). 
 155. SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 37:21. 
 156. Cf. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BAVA BASRA 159a (reasoning that disqualification 
for familial relationship cannot be premised on a concern for biased judgment since 
even Moses and Aaron themselves would be ineligible to judge each other because 
they were brothers); HIRSCH, COMMENTARY, supra note 127, DEUTERONOMY 24:16 
(“The reason for this halacha lies in the very nature of the Jewish institution of juris-
diction by judges.”); cf. SMA, supra note 137, at 33:1; EIBESHUTZ, supra note 130, at 
33:1. 
 157. See generally SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 33:2–12; ARBAH TURIM, 
Choshen Mishpat 33:3–41. 
 158. See QUINT, supra note 149, at 234–36 (explaining the Jewish law approach to 
degrees of relation, and providing a list of thirty-five permutations of disqualifying 
judge-litigant familial relations); see also Rabbi Meyer Waxman, Criminal and Civil 
Procedure of Jewish Courts, in STUDIES IN JEWISH JURISPRUDENCE 181, 212 (Edward 
M. Gorshfield ed., 1971). 
 159. A father and his son are first-first relations since each is one generation re-
moved from their common relative.  In this case, in accordance with the Talmudic 
dictum “a man is related to himself,”  the father himself is the common relative of 
both parties. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 25a.  Legally speaking, the father is 
one generation removed from himself, and the son is one generation removed from 
the father, and father and son are therefore “first-first” relatives, each being one legal 
generation removed from the common ancestor, the father. See BACH, supra note 
151, at 33:3.   
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are referred to as “second-second” relatives.160  Dayanim cannot 
judge cases involving first-first, first-second, or second-second degree 
relatives.161  Some authorities maintain that judges are also disquali-
fied from presiding over cases involving first-third relations, such as a 
great-grandfather and great-grandson or great-nephew and great un-
cle.162  Most hold, however, that such relationships are not disqualify-
ing, and that they merely obligate the presiding judge to voluntarily 
recuse for bias.163  Individuals related in the second-third or third-
third degrees, as well as those more distantly related, may judge each 
other according to all opinions.164 
iii. Bribes, Gifts, and Personal Favors 
The Torah instructs: “You shall not take bribes, for bribes blind the 
eyes of the clear-sighted and corrupt the words of the righteous.”165  
The Talmud explains homiletically that bribery is called “shochad” in 
Hebrew because it makes the judge and bribing litigant like one—
 
 160. See HIRSCH, COMMENTARY, supra note 127, at 24:16 (s.v. Lo Yamusu) (“The 
degrees of relation are reckoned by descent from a common ancestor.  Thus, father 
and son, brother and brother, are relatives of the first degree: first-first; cousins are 
relatives of the second degree: second-second; nephew and uncle, grandson and 
grandfather are first-second; great-grandson and great-grandfather, great-nephew 
and great-uncle are first third, and so forth.”). 
 161. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 7:9, 33:2. 
 162. See, e.g., TOSFOS to BAVA BASRA 129a (s.v. Eehi); BAAL HALACHOS 
GEDOLOS, The Laws of Testimony § 51. See generally BAIS YOSEF, Choshen Mishpat 
33:6 (s.v. Aval L’Rabbeinu Tam). 
 163. See, e.g., R. YITZCHAK ALFASI (11th century), RIF, Bava Basra 56b; R. 
YITZCHAK ALFASI, RIF, Sanhedrin 6b; MISHNAH TORAH, The Laws of Witnesses 
13:4–5; RAMA to SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 33:2 (suggesting that even 
though first-third relatives are not disqualified from judging each other, it is never-
theless proper for them to voluntarily recuse themselves from such cases, though 
their failure to do so will not invalidate a substantively correct ruling).  See generally 
BAIS YOSEF, Choshen Mishpat 33:3. 
 164. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 33:2.  Regardless of whether or not 
a distantly related judge is fully disqualified, he must remain vigilant of his own par-
tiality and is encouraged to voluntarily recuse himself from any suit involving a rela-
tive towards whom he may be unable to remain entirely dispassionate and concerned 
solely for the law. See infra notes 182–183 and accompanying text.  
 165. Exodus 23:8.  The halacha’s concern for judicial graft is so severe that many 
halachic codes introduce their discussion of the subject with a double exhortation: “A 
judge must be very, very careful not to take a bribe, even to find for the party who is 
anyway in the right.” ARBAH TURIM, Choshen Mishpat 9:1 (emphasis added); 
SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 9:1; see also SMA, supra note 137, at 9:1.  
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“shehu chad.”166 A bribed dayan thus becomes a party to the case and 
is legally incapable of presiding.167 
Disqualifying benefits include all valuable goods or services con-
veyed by a party to a judge while the litigant’s case is docketed in the 
dayan’s court.168  Judges are even disqualified for borrowing house-
hold goods from neighbors who are also parties to litigation before 
the judge.169  Talmudic judges held themselves disqualified in numer-
ous seemingly innocuous circumstances, such as where a litigant 
brushed a feather from the judge’s robe, where a party kicked some 
 
 166. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, KESUBOS 105b.  The fundamental incompatibility 
of bribery with the beis din’s proper institutional role is further evidenced by the rule 
disqualifying judges for accepting equally valuable gifts from each party in a case.  
Even though such even-handed bribery would not likely sway a judge to favor one 
litigant over the other, it is nevertheless disqualifying because a bribed judge ceases 
to be the embodiment of the third-party court and becomes a party to the case. See 
R. YEHOSHUA FALK, DRISHA to ARBAH TURIM, Choshen Mishpat 9:1; SMA, supra 
note 137, at 9:2.  Cf. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, KESUBOS 105a (discussing the case of a 
judge who accepted an equal sum from each litigant in payment for his judicial ser-
vices, and then questioning the judge’s conduct as a violation of the prohibition on 
accepting bribes). 
 167. See MISHNAH, BECHOROS 4:6 (“The rulings of a judge that accepts payment 
for judging are null and void.”); BACH, supra note 151, at Choshen Mishpat 9:9 (“It 
appears to me that anytime a judge accepts [a benefit] that falls within the legal defi-
nition of a bribe, his rulings are null and void.”). 
 168. See BACH, supra note 151, at Choshen Mishpat 9:4.  A dayan is not ordinarily 
disqualified, however, by his receiving a gift or other benefit prior to the giver’s filing 
his claim or appeal in the recipient judge’s court, even if the immanency of the liti-
gant was commonly known at the time the gift was given.  See ARBAH TURIM, 
Choshen Mishpat 9:6; SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 9:2.  Nevertheless, be-
cause such gifts may result in the recipient judge’s finding it difficult to remain impar-
tial, judges that receive such preemptive gifts from prospective litigants are strongly 
urged to voluntarily recuse themselves as an expression of personal integrity. See 
ARBAH TURIM, Choshen Mishpat 9:6; SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 9:2; R. 
AVRAHAM TZVI HIRSCH EISENSTADT (1813–1868), PISCHEI TESHUVA, Choshen 
Mishpat 9:5. But see, Eisenstadt, supra, at 9:7 (“If the judge feels that the gift was 
sent to him only because the giver expected to appear before him in litigation . . . 
even if [the case is not to be heard] for some time after the gift is given, the judge is 
disqualified.” (citing BACH, supra note 151, at Choshen Mishpat 9:6)). 
 169. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 9:1 (“Any judge that borrows 
something is disqualified from judging the lender.”).  A judge might preside over a 
case involving his creditor, however, if the nature of their relationship is one of ordi-
nary social convention.  Thus, if a judge borrows from a party while also being in a 
position to lend to that party, the debtor-creditor relationship is considered ordinary 
neighborly sociability, and is not disqualifying. See id. (“[Disqualification for borrow-
ing from a party] applies only if the judge does not have what to lend; but if he has 
what to lend he is qualified, since the party, too, may borrow from him.”).  Even if a 
judge borrows something from a litigant as a matter of ordinary social convention, he 
may still be disqualified if circumstances indicate that the loan was made on account 
of the lender’s pending litigation before the judge. See RAMAH to SHULCHAN 
ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 9:1. 
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dirt to cover spittle that lay at the judge’s feet, and where a litigant 
who was also the judge’s sharecropper delivered the year’s crop to the 
judge shortly before it was actually due.170  Some authorities even dis-
qualify dayanim to whom a litigant says “good morning” or offers 
other salutations or compliments unless the comments could be con-
sidered ordinary social conventions.171 
iv. Advisory Opinions 
Judges are disqualified from deciding cases about which they pre-
viously issued advisory opinions.172  Privately issued legal opinions by 
halachic decisors in response to questions submitted to them by 
members of the public, or responsa, are a major feature of the Torah 
law system.173  R. Shmuel de Medina (1505-1589) explained: 
[O]nce a judge has decided [in a responsa] a question posed to him 
by one [who later appears before him as a] litigant, how can the 
judge now listen to the arguments of the other litigant, for [by com-
mitting himself to a certain legal view on the matter] he has attached 
himself to the subject matter of the case . . . .  Therefore, it appears 
to me that one who has ruled [privately] on a matter cannot be a 
judge in that case . . . for he is interested in the litigation. 174 
Thus, a judge is disqualified from presiding over a case about which 
he previously decided in a responsa because he has an interest in sus-
taining his original ruling, and is therefore a party to the litigation.175 
 
 170. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, KESUBOS 105b. 
 171. See MISHNAH TORAH, The Laws of Sanhedrin 23:3; R. YOSEF COLON 
TRABATTO (1420–1480), RESPONSA MAHARIK § 16.  Most authorities rule that such 
trite platitudes do not disqualify a judge, but that a judge who receives such com-
ments should take stock of his continuing ability to remain impartial, and if in doubt 
should voluntarily recuse himself. See TOSFOS to KESUBOS 105b (s.v. Lo); 
MORDECHAI, supra note 131, at Sanhedrin § 683; TRABATTO, supra, at § 21. See gen-
erally BACH, supra note 151, at Choshen Mishpat 9:4; Eisenstadt, supra note 168, at 
Choshen Mishpat 9:4. 
 172. See RAMAH to SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 17:5 (“A scholar must 
not provide a litigant with a prospective ruling on a matter pending before him, nor 
may he offer his opinion—even without writing a formal decision—as long as he has 
not yet heard both side’s arguments.”); see also R. SHABTAI HAKOHEN (1621–1662), 
SIFSEI KOHEIN 17:9 [hereinafter SHACH]. 
 173. See generally HANINA BEN-MENAHEM & NEIL S. HECHT, AUTHORITY PRO-
CESS AND METHOD: STUDIES IN JEWISH LAW 59–101 (1998) (discussing the history 
and legal authority of responsa literature). 
 174. R. SHMUEL DE MEDINA, RESPONSA MAHARASHDAM, Choshen Mishpat § 2. 
 175. See R. YOSEF TRANI (1538–1639), RESPONSA MAHARIT § 79.  
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b. Voluntary Recusal to Preserve the Professional Integrity of the 
Judge 
Dayanim must render “true,” substantively correct judgments, and 
also keep their decision-making processes “honest” and free of per-
sonal motivations.176  The Torah therefore obligates dayanim to recu-
se themselves from judging matters that strongly implicate their per-
sonal biases, or about which they have extrajudicial knowledge, be-
because, despite their best efforts, they may fail to rule truthfully and 
honestly.177  Because a biased judge’s deciding a case is not incompat-
ible with the court’s institutional third-party role, however, a substan-
tively correct decision by a dayan who improperly failed to recuse 
himself is valid ex post.178  This Section discusses the instances that 
trigger a judge’s duty to voluntarily recuse himself, including where 
he is biased, and where he has prior extrajudicial knowledge about a 
case. 
i. Bias and the Appearance of Bias 
Even an integrious and pious judge may be unable to rule truthful-
ly and honestly in cases that strongly implicate his personal prefer-
ences.179  The Talmud therefore instructs that “[a] man should not 
judge someone he loves or someone he hates.”180  To trigger a judge’s 
duty to recuse himself, a litigant must demonstrate that the judge is 
actually biased.181  Even if actual bias is not proven, however, the To-
rah urges challenged judges to step down because a litigant’s allega-
 
 176. See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text. 
 177. See SMA, supra note 137, at 33:1 (“Judgment is dependent on [the judge’s] 
reasoning, and thought processes may be changed on account of [the judge’s] love or 
hatred [for a litigant], even without malicious intentions.”). 
 178. See Maimonides who writes:  “It is prohibited (assur) for a person to judge a 
party he loves . . .  So too, one may not judge a person he hates . . . .” MISHNAH 
TORAH, The Laws of Sanhedrin 23:6.  Several commentators point to Maimonides’ 
conscious decision to write that a biased judge is “prohibited” rather than “disquali-
fied” (pasul) from judging as indicative of his holding that a biased judge is only pro-
hibited from deciding cases implicating his personal preferences, but that if he did 
rule correctly in the case, his ruling is legally valid after the fact. See, e.g., BAIS 
YOSEF, Choshen Mishpat 7:9, 10 (s.v. Vichein Kasav); ISSER, supra note 138, at 7:2. 
 179. See SMA, supra note 137, at 33:1 
 180. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, KESUBOS 105b. 
 181. See RAMA to SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 7 (“One who says about a 
judge that he hates him, or that he loves his opponent is not believed, and needs 
proof for his allegation.”).  
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tion of judicial partiality may result in the judge’s unconscious preju-
dice toward him.182  The halachic codes further direct judges to recuse 
themselves from all matters that in their own self-introspective judg-
ment strongly implicate their personal values.183 
Halachic authorities disagree about the precise parameters of judg-
es’ duty to recuse themselves.  Some distinguish between cases of ex-
treme and nominal bias, disqualifying judges in cases of the former, 
but only obligating them to recuse ex ante in the latter.184  Relying on 
Talmudic precedent, these authorities maintain that extreme bias on-
ly exists in very limited circumstances, such as where the judge has in-
tentionally refrained from speaking to the litigant out of enmity.185  
Less troubling manifestations of judicial partiality are not disqualify-
ing and merely obligate a dayan to recuse ex ante.186  Most halachic 
decisors disagree with this framework, however, and rule that bias—
no matter how extreme—is never disqualifying.187  These authorities 
maintain that all allegedly biased judges are only obligated to volun-
 
 182. See R. YAAKOV KARLINER, RESPONSA MISHKENOS YAAKOV § 7. 
 183. See generally AVRAHAM DREBERMDIGER, SEDER HADIN 341–43 (2010). 
 184. See, e.g., R. ASHER B. YECHIEL, PISKEI HAROSH to SANHEDRIN 3:23; ARBAH 
TURIM, Choshen Mishpat 7:8; R. DOVID HALEVI SEGEL (1586–1667), TUREI ZAHAV, 
Choshen Mishpat 7:9, 10 (s.v. Ein Hadayan Yachol Ladon); 1 R. YAIR BACHRACH 
(1639–1702), RESPONSA CHAVAS YAIR § 141.  Mandatory disqualification in cases of 
extreme bias, like other grounds for full disqualification, would appear to be prem-
ised on the notion that the judge’s unusually close friendship or bitter rivalry with 
one of the litigants does not merely incline him to a partial verdict, but actually gives 
him a stake in the outcome of the case: his close friend’s winning or his bitter enemy’s 
losing the case is really his own victory. Cf. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 23a 
(tracing disqualification of an extremely biased judge to a biblical verse, Numbers 
35:23, interpreted to disqualify a judge specifically when the judge himself wants to 
cause one of the litigants to lose the case).  
 185. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 27b; see also SIFRI, Deuteronomy § 
181–83 (deriving the three day rule from scriptural sources).  An even more restric-
tive view of disqualifying bias, maintaining that a judge who served as a party’s wed-
ding attendant is only disqualified on the first day following the wedding, is cited by 
EISENSTADT, supra note 168, at Choshen Mishpat 7:13. EIBESHUTZ, supra note 130, at 
7:17, rules that while the Jewish people remain in the Diaspora, their happiness is re-
duced, and consequently, the especially close friendship between a groom and his 
groomsman lasts only for one day.  Therefore, a groomsman-judge is disqualified 
from presiding over a case involving the groom on the day of the wedding, but not for 
any period of time thereafter. 
 186. See R. ASHER B. YECHIEL, supra note 154, at 56:9 (“If a judge proceeds to 
preside” over a case implicating his biases, the litigant prejudiced by the judge’s bias 
“cannot disqualify him entirely unless he demonstrates by eyewitness testimony that 
the judge had not spoken to him in the last three days out of enmity.”). 
 187. See SMA, supra note 137, at 7:19. 
PILL_CHRISTENSEN 5/10/2012  12:43 PM 
546 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
tarily recuse ex ante, and that their failure to step down will not inval-
idate their otherwise substantively correct rulings ex post.188 
ii. Prior Knowledge 
The Torah says, “I charged your judges with their duties, saying: 
‘Hear disputes between your brethren, and then you may judge cor-
rectly and justly between man and his fellow.’”189  The Talmud inter-
prets this verse as requiring dayanim to learn about a case only 
through adversarial judicial proceedings.190 A dayan who receives in-
formation about a case without the benefit of also hearing an oppos-
ing point of view in the context of formal adversarial proceedings 
risks unconsciously closing his mind to alternative narratives and issu-
ing a partial decision.191 
This rule is restated in the halachic codes, which obligate judges 
who receive extrajudicial information about a case to recuse them-
selves, though such knowledge is not fully disqualifying.192  Maimoni-
des recognizes the prior knowledge rule as a judicial ideal: “Both liti-
gants must be equal in the eyes of the judge, and there is no more 
correct and righteous judge than one that does not recognize the liti-
gants or the subject matter of the case.”193 
 
 188. See, e.g., BAIS YOSEF, Choshen Mishpat 7:9, 10 (explaining Maimonides’ posi-
tion on judicial bias in MISHNAH TORAH, The Laws of Sanhedrin 23:6 as disqualifying 
extremely biased judges and invalidating their verdicts, but merely obligating moder-
ately biased judges to recuse themselves and validating their substantively correct de-
cisions rendered in violation of this prohibition against sitting); SMA, supra note 137, 
at 7:18–19.  Some of the more permissive opinions still distinguish between extreme 
and nominal bias, holding that extreme bias obligates the judge to recuse, while nom-
inal bias has no legal ramifications on the judge whatsoever, though he is neverthe-
less urged to step down as an expression of personal piety and integrity. See TOSFOS 
to SANHEDRIN 8a (s.v. Pasilnah);  MORDECHAI to SANHEDRIN § 683. 
 189. Deuteronomy 1:16 (emphasis added). 
 190. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SANHEDRIN 7b. 
 191. See RASHI to SANHEDRIN 7b (s.v. Shomeah Bein Acheichem) (“The judge 
should listen to the litigants evidence and claims when they are both together before 
him, but he must not hear one account without the other side’s being present, for it 
will cause him to set falsehood as truth since there is nothing [presently] contradicting 
it.  And since the judge’s heart will be inclined to rule in favor of the narrative he 
hears alone, he may not be able to bring himself to find in favor of the side he hears 
from later [during court proceedings].”). 
 192. See, e.g., SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 17:5; SMA, supra note 137, at 
17:11 (“[Once a judge has received extrajudicial information about a case] he may not 
preside over the case thereafter unless the parties agree to be judged in his court even 
though he has already heard about the case.”); R. YAAKOV B. MOSHE LEVI MOELIN 
(1365–1427), RESPONSA MAHARIL § 195. 
 193. MISHNAH TORAH, Laws of Sanhedrin 23:6. 
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c. Judges’ Extralegal Duty to Treat Litigants Equally 
Dayanim must maintain high standards of personal integrity in 
their management of court proceedings.194  “Every [Jew] is obligated 
to uphold the Torah, and this common obligation forms the bond that 
joins . . . the witnesses . . . the litigants and the judges: . . . This 
bond . . . must be apparent throughout the whole legal procedure, and 
should be emphasized with full clarity, unalloyed by a foreign ele-
ment.”195  Dayanim affirm their commitment to the halacha and their 
humble role in God’s creative order by treating every party equally, 
privately internalizing and publicly affirming that “the judgment is 
God’s,”196 and that everyone—especially the judge—is equally bound 
by Torah law. 
The halacha prescribes numerous personal judicial obligations de-
signed to ensure that every litigant is (and believes he is) treated 
equally under God’s law.197  The general refrain, “judges must be 
careful to treat the litigants equally,”198 entails a variety of specific ob-
ligations.199  Judges may not allow one party to present its case at 
length while cutting the other short;200 they may not speak to one liti-
gant amicably and to the other harshly;201 they may not allow one par-
ty to sit in court while requiring the other to stand;202 and they may 
not permit one side to bring counsel to court while denying that op-
portunity to the other party.203  Judges must even ensure that a liti-
gant does not appear in court dressed in a manner that would intimi-
date his opponent,204 and must help unintelligent litigants articulate 
 
 194. See supra notes 139–43 and accompanying text. 
 195. See HIRSCH, COMMENTARY, supra note 127, at 24:16 (s.v. Lo Yamusu); see 
also Dr. Naftali Hirsch, Pricip des Beweifes und Beweisverfahrens im Criminalprozes 
des Jud Rechtes, 12 JESHURUN 80 (1865) (Ger.) [hereinafter Hirsch, Pricip]. 
 196. Deuteronomy 1:17. 
 197. See generally MISHNAH TORAH, The Laws of Sanhedrin 23; ARBAH TURIM, 
Choshen Mishpat 17; SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 17. 
 198. ARBAH TURIM, Choshen Mishpat 17:1; see also MISHNAH TORAH, The Laws 
of Sanhedrin 21:1 (“What is correct and righteous judgment? This is when both liti-
gants are made equal [in the eyes of the judge] in all matters.”). 
 199. See generally SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 17:1–4. 
 200. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SHEVUOS 30a; SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen 
Mishpat 17:1. 
 201. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SHEVUOS 30a; SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen 
Mishpat 17:1. 
 202. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 17:1–3. 
 203. See MORDECHAI to SANHEDRIN § 761; SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 
17:4. 
 204. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 17:1 (“If one litigant wears notice-
ably expensive clothing while the other is dressed in a cheap and degrading manner, 
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their claims.205  These rules negate distinctions of class, wealth, social 
standing, and even intelligence, emphasizing the inherent equality of 
participants in the adjudicatory process and their equal obligation to 
the Torah.206 These rules also promote rulings grounded solely in le-
gal value judgments by protecting judges’ decision-making processes 
against the subconscious influence of parties’ appearance, social 
standing, or articulateness.207 
II.  THE AMERICAN AND HALACHIC DOCTRINES OF JUDICIAL 
REMOVAL: A COMPARISON 
This Part discusses four principle differences between American 
and Jewish disqualification jurisprudence.  First, American recusal 
law is grounded in rights-based jurisprudence, but the halachic ap-
proach relies on a duty-focused legal tradition.208  Second, American 
law polices actual and apparent judicial bias in order to protect liti-
gants’ rights and promote public confidence on the court system, but 
Jewish recusal doctrine focuses on preserving proper institutional ar-
rangements between courts, judges, and litigants, and on engendering 
a professionally and personally integrious judiciary.209 Third, the 
American doctrine relies on mandatory disqualification to ensure ju-
dicial impartiality, while the halachic approach limits top-down dis-
qualification in favor of utilizing judges’ duty-consciousness and self-
 
the judges say to the well-dressed party, ‘either dress your opponent as you dress 
yourself, or dress as he does.’”); see also MISHNAH TORAH, The Laws of Sanhedrin 
21:2.  Because in modern times disparities in dress between rich and poor are less 
pronounced than they once were, however, batei din do not maintain this practice, 
and instead verbally assure a poorly dressed litigant that his appearance will in no 
way cause the court to favor his better dressed opponent for “justice can uproot 
mountains.” BACH, supra note 151, at Choshen Mishpat 17:1 (s.v. V’im Ha’echan 
Lavush Begadim Na’im); see SHACH, supra note 172, at 17:2. 
 205. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 17:9 (“If the judge is aware of a fa-
vorable argument for one of the litigants, and sees that the litigant wants to articulate 
the argument but cannot—either because he does not know how to organize his 
words; or, because he has forgotten the argument on account of his being agitated by 
his desire to save himself with a true claim, or due to the anger he feels [towards his 
opponent]; or because he is embarrassed on account of his weak intelligence—the 
judge should help him by reminding him of the beginning of the argument . . . .”).  
 206. See HIRSCH, COMMENTARY, supra note 127, at 24:16 (s.v. Lo Yamusu); see 
also Hirsch, Pricip, supra note 195; QUINT, supra note 149, at 132–35. 
 207. See RASHI to SHEVUOS 31a (s.v. Lavush K’mosoh) (“So that the [exquisite 
dress] of one party should not cause the judges to incline their faces [i.e., incline their 
decision making] towards him.”). 
 208. See infra notes 212–20 and accompanying text. 
 209. See infra notes 221–29 and accompanying text. 
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discipline to achieve unbiased judging.210  Finally, in American law a 
judge’s improper failure to recuse himself warrants reversal of his fi-
nal judgment, while the halacha voids a biased judge’s ruling only 
when it is substantively incorrect, relying instead on peer review of 
the dayan’s personal and professional decisions to ensure an 
integrious judiciary.211 
American political and legal culture—including judicial disqualifi-
cation law—is dominated by rights-based thinking; it is concerned 
primarily with what individuals and societies can properly demand 
from one another.212  In rights-focused jurisprudence, the law articu-
lates positive and negative entitlements which provide individuals 
with the freedom to act secure from interference within these rights-
protected spheres.213  Modern recusal jurisprudence, too, is rights-
focused; litigants are entitled to an impartial judge,214 entitled to a 
court system that upholds their legal rights in both fact and appear-
ance, and entitled to a justice system in which they can place their 
trust.215 
The chessed-based halachic system, by contrast, is principally con-
cerned with duties,216 with what individuals and societies owe to one 
another and the self-transcendental moral quality of public and pri-
 
 210. See infra notes 223–35 and accompanying text. 
 211. See infra notes 238–42 and accompanying text. 
 212. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF OUR PO-
LITICAL DISCOURSE 3–5 (1991); John Laws, Beyond Rights, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUDIES 265, 265–66 (2003) (“The vocabulary of modern liberal speech is very large-
ly the vocabulary of rights.”). 
 213. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 171–73 (1977).  
 214. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra notes 10–20 and accompanying text. 
 216. See Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Or-
der, 5 J.L. & REL. 65, 65 (1987) (“The principle word in Jewish law, which occupies a 
place equivalent in evocative force to the American legal system’s ‘rights,’ is the word 
‘mitzvah,’ which literally means commandment but has a general meaning closer to 
‘incumbent obligation.’”); see also SOL ROTH, HALAKHA AND POLITICS: THE JEWISH 
IDEA OF THE STATE 97 (1988); Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical Obligations Serious-
ly: A Look at American Codes of Professional Responsibility Through a Perspective 
of Jewish Law and Ethics, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 165, 182 (2007); Silberg, supra note 
116, at 312 (“[In Jewish law], when a person refuses to pay his debt he is physically 
coerced to fulfill his religious obligation to pay.  The concern of the court is not the 
creditor’s debt, his damages, but the duty of the debtor, his religious-moral duty, the 
fulfillment of a precept by him.  The creditor receives his money almost incidentally, 
as a secondary result of the performance of this duty.”). 
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vate conduct.217  Jewish disqualification doctrine, therefore, focuses 
on what batei din and dayanim owe litigants rather than on what dis-
putants may demand from courts and judges.  Batei din owe dispu-
tants a moralizing, other-referential determination of their Torah ob-
ligations.218  Dayanim are obligated to issue “true and honest” 
decisions,219 and have a duty to develop their humane qualities in a 
chessed-focused manner by treating parties equally under the law.220 
Based on their different jurisprudential traditions, the American 
and Jewish recusal schemes offer unique visions of the goals of judi-
cial disqualification.  American doctrine, grounded in rights-
jurisprudence, seeks to preserve litigants’ and the public’s right to a 
justice system that metes out impartial decisions grounded in legal 
norms.221  To this end, the American approach prevents actually or 
apparently biased rulings by disqualifying judges from cases that im-
plicate their biases.222  Thus, like American law generally, contempo-
rary recusal doctrine enforces minimal standards of conduct without 
encouraging unnecessarily integrious actions;223 as long as the bad 
man cannot be (or pays for being) bad, it matters little whether we 
teach and encourage him to be good.224  American recusal doctrine 
 
 217. See DWORKIN, supra note 213.  For an articulate explication of the moral dis-
tinction between rights-based and duty-focused jurisprudence, see Laws, supra note 
212, at 269. 
[W]hat is meant by the statement that I have a moral right—a right to do 
something, or a right not to have something done to me?  It is not a state-
ment that implies any virtue on my part.  I am not good because I assert that 
I have a right.  I am not bad because I do not do so.  The assertion of a right 
involves no moral action on my part.  There is nothing virtuous in my assert-
ing it.  It is not an act of self sacrifice or self restraint, kindness or considera-
tion towards anyone else; it is not other centered, it claims what is due, or 
what is thought to be due. 
Id. 
 218. See supra notes 124–31 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra notes 132–38 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra notes 139–43 and accompanying text. 
 221. See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra Part I.A.. 
 223. This general tendency of American law is well exemplified by rules like the 
tort doctrine of no affirmative duty to rescue.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS 
§37 (2005).  Cf. Joseph S. Jackson & Lauren G. Fasig, The Parentless Child’s Right to 
a Permanent Family, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 5 (2011) (“Constitutional require-
ments typically function as negative rights. They prohibit governmental actors from 
usurping powers beyond the scope of their authority and they protect individuals 
from certain forms of state action, rather than imposing affirmative duties on the 
government to provide for the individual’s protection and welfare.”). 
 224. For a discussion of the “bad man” theory of law, see Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459–62 (1897). 
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thus controls judicial bias to protect private and public rights, but 
does not impose ethical standards beyond those necessary to preserve 
the rights of litigants and the public.225 
Duty-oriented Jewish disqualification law is less concerned with 
preventing dishonest judges from harming litigants and more focused 
on directing dayanim to be as moral and integrious as possible.226  The 
halacha cannot merely prevent wrongdoing, it must also teach and 
empower potential wrongdoers to do right; helping man be good is 
the raison d’etre of the Torah law system.227  Therefore, Jewish law 
does not coercively prevent partial judges from acting dishonestly, but 
instead directs them to voluntarily preserve their professional trust228 
and to develop their personal integrity.229 
The American and Jewish doctrines also diverge in their approach-
es to enforcing recusal rules.  Rights-based American disqualification 
law relies on a top-down scheme for removing judges.230 When a 
judge’s impartiality can be reasonably questioned, that judge is ad-
judged unfit to preside; he is disqualified regardless of his own self-
conscious assessment of his ability to rule impartially.231  Consonant 
with American law’s rights-foundations, this mandatory approach en-
sures that litigants’ and the public’s rights are protected against biased 
judgments,232 even as its stifling judicial self-discipline fails to encour-
age integrious judging grounded in judges’ sense of institutional, pro-
fessional, and personal duty.233 
The Jewish disqualification regime, by contrast, is a bottom-up sys-
tem.  The halacha mandatorily disqualifies judges only when their 
presiding would be inconsistent with the courts’ institutional func-
tion,234 and in such instances disqualification is more descriptive than 
prescriptive; a judge simply cannot be a party to a suit and still remain 
a judge.235  In all cases where a judge’s fitness to rule turns on his sub-
 
 225. Indeed, the duty to sit doctrine might actually discourage morally-minded ju-
rists from acting with integrity by recusing themselves from cases from which they are 
not legally disqualified to protect the rights of the parties. See infra notes 281–282 
and accompanying text and sources. 
 226. See supra notes 139–43 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra note 216. 
 228. See supra notes 124–43 and accompanying text. 
 229. See generally supra Part I.B.2.c. 
 230. See supra notes 37–45 and accompanying text. 
 231. See infra notes 280–81 and accompanying text. 
 232. See infra notes 280–81 and accompanying text. 
 233. See infra notes 280–81 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra notes 125–31 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. 
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jective state of mind, the halacha relies on the judge himself to 
integriously evaluate his own impartiality and to determine whether 
he should voluntarily recuse due to the risk of biased judgment.236  By 
insuring impartial judging through voluntary recusal, the halachic sys-
tem infuses judges with a sense of moral obligation, encouraging them 
to live up to the law’s high expectations.237 
The Jewish and American doctrines also differ in how they deal 
post hoc with decisions improperly issued by judges who should have 
recused.  American law immediately addresses the problem of biased 
rulings by disqualifying potentially partial judges before they can ex-
press their prejudices in judicial opinions.238  When prophylactic dis-
qualification fails and a judge presides when he should have recused 
himself, the judge’s final disposition is reversed on appeal, even if the 
decision is substantively correct, thereby preserving litigants’ rights 
and public confidence in the courts.239 
The halacha, however, only voids judicial decisions when they can-
not be fairly characterized as court proceedings on account of the 
judge’s being a party to the case.240  When a partial dayan decides a 
case after wrongly failing to recuse himself, however, his ruling is con-
sidered substantively; the decision is reversed if it cannot be legally 
justified, but upheld if it can be justified.241  A biased judge who fails 
 
 236. See supra notes 132–38 and accompanying text. 
 237. See ARBAH TURIM, Choshen Mishpat 1:2 (quoting 2 Chronicles 17:6) (“[Je-
hoshaphat] appointed judges for every city, and he said to them: ‘Be well aware of 
what you do, for it is not for men that you judge, but for God! And He will be with 
you in judgment.’”).  
 238. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judging, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 460 (2004) 
(“[D]isqualification . . . can be effective at screening out [biased] judges.”). 
 239. See FLAMM, supra note 10, at 1012 (“The traditional rule was that when a dis-
qualified judge sat in violation of an express statutory standard, his rulings were to be 
vacated on appeal.”); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (hold-
ing that a partial judge’s presiding over a case is a “structural defect” in the proceed-
ings that is not subject to “harmless-error’ standards”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise 
of Procedurally Centered Judicial Disqualification and a Stronger Conception of the 
Appearance Standard: Better Acknowledging and Adjusting to Cognitive Bias, Spo-
liation, and Perceptual Realities, 30 REV. LITIG. 733, 758 (2011) (“[A] judge about 
whom there exists a reasonable question regarding impartiality should not preside. 
Everything taking place in the case after the improper failure to recuse is wrongful, 
and the resulting outcome should logically be viewed as a nullity . . . .”).  But see, e.g., 
Lyons v. Sheetz, 834 F.2d 493, 495 n.1 (5th Cir. 1987) (ruling that while the trial judge 
should have disqualified himself, his decision should be upheld because it was the on-
ly possible reasonable disposition); Powell v. Anderson, 660 N.W.2d 107, 120 (Minn. 
2003) (“[N]ot every case involving judicial disqualification deserves vacatur.”). 
 240. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text. 
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to recuse himself, but whose decision is upheld as substantively cor-
rect may nevertheless be disciplined if his ethical failing is deemed in-
dicative of his unfitness to hold judicial office.242 
The respective American and halachic approaches to recusal thus 
come full circle.  The American disqualification doctrine is grounded 
in a culture of rights, and focuses strictly on protecting the entitle-
ment to a fair legal process by enforcing minimum standards of im-
partial judicial decision-making through a top-down mandatory dis-
qualification scheme supplemented by ex post reversal of biased 
judges’ decisions.  By contrast, traditional Jewish recusal law is rooted 
in duty-jurisprudence, and concentrates on fostering judges’ moral in-
tegrity by directing batei din and dayanim to maintain high standards 
of institutional, professional, and personal integrity through a largely 
voluntary recusal scheme that still protects litigants’ rights by revers-
ing actually biased judicial rulings. 
III.  MOVING IN A NEW DIRECTION: TOWARD A DUTY-FOCUSED 
RECUSAL JURISPRUDENCE 
This Part suggests that the conceptual disqualification framework 
of traditional Jewish law provides a valuable perspective that might 
be used to improve the problem-plagued contemporary American 
doctrine.  This Part begins in Section III.A., which highlights the need 
for recusal reform by laying out some serious failings of the contem-
porary recusal regime, all of which relate to the rights-based and 
mandatory-disqualification-focused nature of the current approach.  
In light of these problems, Section III.B. proposes a duty-based alter-
native to contemporary disqualification jurisprudence based on 
halachic recusal law, which, by focusing on the third-party institution-
al role of courts and the personal and professional ethical obligations 
of judges, might improve on some of the deficiencies that inhere in 
the current disqualification system. 
A. Problems with the Current American Doctrine 
Rights-based American disqualification doctrine seeks to protect 
litigants’ rights and to promote public confidence in the courts by 
mandatorily removing judges in an expansive array of circumstances 
 
 242. Cf. MISHNAH TORAH, The Laws of Sanhedrin 2:8 (discussing ethical and mor-
al standards of judicial conduct and integrity and implying that judges failing to meet 
these criteria are unfit to remain on the bench). 
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in which the law determines they are or appear to be biased.243  This 
Section discusses three major failings of the contemporary recusal re-
gime that stem from its rights-focused jurisprudential foundations, 
and which highlight the need for a new disqualification framework 
not grounded in rights-jurisprudence.  Subpart III.A.1. argues that 
recusal law fails to adequately protect litigants’ rights from biased 
judging because the doctrine conclusorily determines judges’ impar-
tiality based on malleable decisional standards.  Subpart III.A.2. con-
tends that the law’s quixotic obsession with appearances fails to en-
gender public confidence in the justice system because it over and 
under enforces actual judicial impartiality.  Finally, Subpart III.A.3. 
argues that American recusal jurisprudence fails to address the root 
of the judicial bias problem because the contemporary rights-focused 
doctrine virtually ignores judges’ personal and professional moral in-
tegrity. 
1. The Failure of Ad Hoc and Conclusory Recusal Doctrines to 
Adequately Protect Litigants from Biased Judgments 
American recusal doctrine purports to protect the rights of individ-
ual litigants from biased judging by disqualifying judges that are or 
appear to be biased.244  Bias, however, is a vague and subjective con-
cept, more a statement of legal conclusion than an actual description 
of a judge’s state of mind.  Judges, like all human beings, are bi-
ased;245 such personal values literally “constitute our being.”246  Most 
 
 243. See supra Part II. 
 244. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 245. See CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES (Daniel Kaneman & Amos Tversky eds., 
2000); Burg, supra note 22, at 1485; Leubsdorf, supra note 29, at 237 (“We all take it 
for granted that personal values and assumptions help shape every judge’s deci-
sions.”); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Impartial Judge, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 605, 606 
(1996); Nancy A. Welsh, What Is “(Im)Partial Enough” in a World of Embedded 
Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 395 (2010); see also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NA-
TURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1921) (“[Human beings] try to see things as ob-
jectively as we please. Nonetheless, we can never see them with any eyes except our 
own.”); Catherine A Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional 
Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 53, 68 (2005) 
(“[A]bsolute impartiality is impossible as a matter of cognitive psychology.”). Cf. 
CARDOZO, supra, at 167, 176. 
 246. RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, 
HERMENEUTICS AND PRAXIS 129 (1983) (quoting HANS GORG GADAMER, PHILO-
SOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 9 (1976)); see also Harold Bloom, Breaking the Form, in  
DECONSTRUCTION AND CRITICISM 1, 9 (Jacques Derrida, et al., eds., 1979) (“There is 
always and only bias, inclination, pre-judgment, swerve.”); Leubsdorf, supra note 29, 
at  250 (“[U]nconscious motives sway everyone”). 
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biases—a preference for chicken over beef, or a strong commitment 
to majoritarian government—do not rise to the level of disqualifying 
prejudice, however.247  The right biases—preconceptions representing 
the community’s most cherished values—are not only tolerated, but 
encouraged.248  Judges are only disqualified for the wrong kinds of bi-
ases, the kinds of “wrongful or inappropriate”249  impressions that, in 
the eyes of the law, lead to judgments based on personal rather than 
legal values.250  Recusal law’s disqualifying judges based on 
conclusory findings of improper bias is thus “a step backward in [the] 
journey” toward the rule of law.251  “Instead of rules, we have the 
conclusory prohibition of a vague term that invites ad hoc and ex post 
facto judgments.”252 
Under current law, a challenged judge determines whether an al-
leged bias is disqualifying.253 This scheme curiously leaves questions 
about whether a judge “shall” be mandatorily disqualified to the 
 
 247. See In re J.P. Linaham, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1943) (“If, however, 
bias and partiality be defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions in the 
mind of the judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will.”); Lind-
sey v. City of Beaufort, 911 F. Supp. 962, 968 (D.S.C. 1995) (“Bias cannot be defined 
as the total absence of preconceptions.”); Cravens, supra note 11, at  29 (“There will 
always be some bias that does not rise to a level meriting recusal.”). 
 248. See Linaham, 138 F.2d at 652–53 (reasoning that some preconceptions repre-
sent the community’s most cherished values, and need not be disregarded by judges, 
but that a judge’s other “idiosyncratic” and “uniquely personal prejudice[s]” should 
not be tolerated); Leubsdorf, supra note 29, at 250–52.  
 249. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550 (1994). 
 250. See id. at 552 (“[T]he pejorative connotation of the terms ‘bias’ and ‘preju-
dice’ demands that they be applied only to judicial predispositions that go beyond 
what is normal and acceptable.”) (emphasis added); see also Spangler v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 759 F. Supp. 1327, 1332 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (“[L]itigants are protected from 
bias not by its absence but by the contours within which it must be exercised.”). 
 251. Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of Impropriety, and the 
Proposed New ABA Judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1337, 1343 (2006). 
 252. Id. 
 253. See, e.g., In re Bertrand, 31 F.3d 842, 843 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he somewhat 
surprising (and not entirely comfortable) reality is that the motion is addressed to, 
and must be decided by, the very judge whose impartiality is being questioned.”); 
Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 79, 89 (Pa. 1998) (“As a general rule, a mo-
tion for recusal is initially directed to and decided by the jurist whose impartiality is 
being challenged.”); see also Roy v. Tomlinson, 639 So.2d 1112, 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1994) (“[A] motion to disqualify a judge should be acted upon by the judge to 
whom the motion is directed.”); People v. Johnson, 294 A.D.2d 908, 908 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2002) (“[T]he court is the sole arbiter of whether it should recuse.”); Magill v. 
Casel, 568 A.2d 1221, 1224 (Pa. 1990) (“A motion for recusal must be made to the 
judge sought to be disqualified.”). 
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“sound discretion” of the challenged judge himself,254 running the risk 
that an actually biased judge may use his discretion to deny meritori-
ous recusal motions.255  This danger is alleviated by limiting chal-
lenged judges’ discretion by requiring them to assume the truth of 
factual allegations in a recusal motion,256 and allowing them to decide 
only whether those facts are legally sufficient to indicate a disqualify-
ing bias.257  This limitation does little to prevent judges from exercis-
ing biased discretion in ruling on their own impartiality, however, be-
cause disingenuous judges can circumvent the presumption of truth 
by characterizing factual claims as conclusions;258 by holding that al-
leged facts are not relevant;259 or by finding that alleged biases are 
based on court proceedings or on general views about the law and 
 
 254. See Garcia v. Women’s Hospital, 143 F.3d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The tenor 
of § 455’s language is mandatory, but this Court has recognized that disqualification 
under this section ‘is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.’”); Unit-
ed States v. Hatchett, 978 F.2d 1259 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[28 U.S.C. § 455] is addressed to 
the trial judge who is the subject of the motion to disqualify, and requires that the 
judge disqualify himself from the proceeding. The use of the imperative ‘shall dis-
qualify himself’ further demonstrates that the decision is placed squarely in the hands 
of the questioned judge himself.”). 
 255. See Miller, supra note 238, at 461–62. 
 256. See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 33–35 (1921); United States v. Furst, 
886 F.2d 558, 582 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[A] district judge faced with a motion for disquali-
fication under 28 U.S.C. § 144, must accept the allegations of the moving party as true 
. . . .”); Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he judge may not 
consider the truth of the facts alleged.”); Klinck v. Dist. Court of the Eighteenth Ju-
dicial Dist., 876 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Colo. 1994) (“For purposes of our review, we also 
must take the facts asserted in the motion and affidavits as true.”); Suarez v. State, 
527 So.2d 190, 191 (Fla. 1988) (“The judge with respect to whom a motion to disquali-
fy is made may only determine whether the motion is legally sufficient and is not al-
lowed to pass on the truth of the allegations.”).  But see, e.g., Dyson v. Sposeep, 637 
F. Supp. 616, 619 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (“[T]he judge determining the motion need not 
accept as true the allegations made in the recusal motion; the judge may contradict 
the allegations with facts drawn from his own personal knowledge.”); State v. Mincey, 
687 P.2d 1180, 1197 (Ariz. 1984) (“It is the burden of the moving party to establish 
the truth of his or her allegations.”). 
 257. See, e.g., St. David’s Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 921 
P.2d 821, 833 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (“The reviewing judge, as well as the appellate 
court, passes only on the legal sufficiency of the affidavit and not on the truth of the 
facts alleged.”); see also supra note 45. 
 258. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Liquor Salesmen’s Union, 444 F.2d 1344, 1349 (2d Cir. 
1971) (rejecting as conclusory a disqualification motion alleging that one party’s at-
torney stated that he was “very close to” the judge and “could get favored treatment 
from her”). 
 259. See, e.g., United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1166 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 908 (1985) (finding that allegations of a judge’s friendship with a 
murder victim were not relevant to the judge’s ability to fairly try the alleged mur-
derer because the judge’s hatred for the real killer was not relevant to his opinion 
about the defendant who was merely accused of committing the murder). 
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life.260  The problem is exacerbated by judges assessing the recusal 
motions using a reasonable person standard.261  Even well-meaning 
judges may erroneously decide both the truth and sufficiency of al-
leged facts because of the difficulty inherent in deciding whether the 
facts would lead a reasonable person to question their impartiality 
without also considering whether a reasonable person would find 
those facts sufficiently plausible to convince him of anything at all.262  
As a result of these malleable decisional standards, it is often the 
judges who fail to recuse themselves that ought to have been disquali-
fied, while those with the integrity to step down when challenged 
could likely have judged the matter impartially in any case.263 
Due in part to the discretion judges have in ruling on disqualifica-
tion motions, recusal law is often inconsistent and unpredictable, fur-
ther threatening litigants’ rights.  The tension between the law’s en-
couraging disqualification in doubtful cases and the extrajudicial 
source rule illustrates the problem.264  The extrajudicial source origi-
nated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Liteky v. United States,265 
where the Court held that a judge who directed deprecatory com-
ments towards a defendant and his counsel in prior judicial proceed-
ings was not disqualified from trying that same defendant in a later 
 
 260. The extra-judicial source rule limits biased-based disqualification to biases 
that arise from the judge’s personal opinions about a party rather than any judicial 
opinion the judge may form about a party based on in-court proceedings. See Liteky 
v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994) (applying the extra-judicial source rule to 
motions made under 28 U.S.C. § 455); United States v. Grinell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 
583 (1966) (applying the extra-judicial source rule to motions made under 28 U.S.C. § 
144); see also State v. Williams, 601 So.2d 1374, 1375 (La. 1992); Purpura v. Purpura, 
847 P.2d 314, 318 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); Bell v. N.Y. Higher Educ. Assistance Corp., 
560 N.Y.S.2d 439, 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); In re Antonio, 612 A.2d 650, 653 (R.I. 
1992). See generally FLAMM, supra note 10, at 81–102; supra note 89.  
 261. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text. 
 262. See, e.g., United States v. Hanrahan, 248 F. Supp. 471, 477 (D.D.C. 1965), 
aff’d sub nom. Tynan v. United States, 376 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (denying recusal 
motion alleging a judge threatened the defendant with prison time if he refused to 
plead guilty because the “allegation is not only untrue, but also ridiculous.  It is in-
conceivable that any sane and reasonable mind could believe that such a statement 
was made . . . the court holds it to be legally sufficient.”), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 845 
(1967); see also Burg, supra note 22, at 1467.  For a discussion of some additional log-
ical and administrative difficulties associated with the use of the  rational person 
standard in recusal law see McKoski, supra note 23, at 1945–46. 
 263. Cf. Leubsdorf, supra note 29, at 277. 
 264. See generally Adam J. Safer, The Illegitimacy of the Extrajudicial Source Re-
quirement for Judicial Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 15 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 787, 791 (1993) (arguing that “the extrajudicial source requirement detracts 
from judicial integrity”). 
 265. 510 U.S. 540 (1994).  
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case  because the judge’s prejudice was the product of judicial pro-
ceedings and was therefore “not subject to the deprecatory character-
ization as ‘bias’ or ‘prejudice.’”266  The extrajudicial source rule, how-
ever, is at odds with the pro-recusal tenor of the federal 
disqualification statutes.267  Modern disqualification law strives to 
eliminate even the appearance of bias, but the extrajudicial source 
rule sanctions—and even encourages268—actual partiality provided it 
stems from a judge’s professional rather than personal experiences. 
The “duty to sit,” raises similar problems.269  The duty to sit, which 
instructs judges to decide the cases assigned to them absent compel-
ling reasons for recusal,270  is a long standing principle of American 
disqualification law, and continues to feature prominently in federal 
and state court decisions despite the contemporary trend favoring 
recusal.271  This doctrine places judges faced with difficult disqualifica-
tion motions on the horns of a dilemma: they are obligated to sit ab-
sent compelling reasons to recuse, but must disqualify themselves 
whenever their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, a stand-
ard that is likely satisfied by any good-faith recusal motion.272 
 
 266. Id. at 551. 
 267. See, e.g., Safer, supra note 264. 
 268. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551 (reasoning that a judge’s personal views are 
“properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings, and are indeed 
sometimes . . . necessary to completion of the judge’s task.”). 
 269. See generally MACKENZIE, supra note 17, at 81; Stempel, supra note 21, at 
814–18. 
 270. See, e.g., ABA CODE, supra note 12, Cannon 3(B)(1) (“A judge shall hear and 
decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which disqualification is re-
quired.”); Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360, 362 n.2 (5th Cir. 1964) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1000 (1965). 
 271. See Switzer v. Berry, 198 F.3d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 2000); Maier v. Orr, 758 
F.2d 1578, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Blizard v. Frechette, 601 F.2d 1217, 1221 (1st Cir. 
1979); United States v. Bray, 546 F.2d 851, 857 (10th Cir. 1976);  Peterson v. Borst, 
784 N.E.2d 934, 936 (Ind. 2003); Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass’n v. Bagely & 
Co., 996 P.2d 534, 538 (Utah 2000). But see, e.g., In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 
764, 784 (3d Cir. 1992). See generally FLAMM, supra note 10, at 604–12. 
 272. See United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d, 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[A]ny 
doubts must be resolved in favor of recusal.”); Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Dio-
cese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 659 (10th Cir. 2002) (“If the issue of whether § 
455 requires disqualification is a close one, the judge must be recused.”); Republic of 
Pan. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 217 F.3d 343, 347 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[I]f the question of 
whether § 455(a) requires disqualification is a close one the balance tips in favor of 
recusal.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Snyder, 235 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 
2000) (“[T]he duty to recuse and the duty to sit do not exert equal pull; in close cases, 
‘doubts ordinarily ought to be resolved in favor of recusal.’”); Union Planter’s Bank 
v. L & J. Dev. Co., 115 F.3d 378, 383 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Where the question is close, 
the judge must recuse himself.” (citing United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1349 
(6th Cir. 1993))); Stempel, supra note 21, at 821–23. 
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Wide judicial discretion in deciding recusal motions by using flexi-
ble, conclusory, and conflicting standards undermines the law’s ability 
to protect litigants against partial rulings. Instead of a consistent and 
predictable doctrine, recusal law is highly dependent on the whims 
and personal discretion of individual judges.  Instead of a rule of law, 
disqualification is a law of men that provides little protection against 
a truly biased judge bent on using the adjudicatory process to further 
his personal value judgments. 
2. The Failure of Expansive Disqualification Doctrines to Promote 
Public Confidence in the Justice System 
American disqualification law’s quixotic quest to eradicate actual 
and apparent judicial bias undermines public confidence in the court 
system.  The current regime tries to engender public trust in the judi-
ciary with a dramatic show of force by disqualifying judges in an ever 
expanding set of questionable circumstances.273  Liberal recusal 
standards, however, are self-defeating.  The modern doctrine threat-
ens public confidence in the courts because by disqualifying every 
judge whose “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” the law 
simultaneously over-enforces and under-enforces actual judicial im-
partiality and cheapens the idea of judicial integrity.274 
Professor Rotunda observes that “[o]ne can . . . be too ethical.”275  
By over-enforcing disqualification against impartial judges due to the 
mere appearance of impropriety, recusal law denigrates the notion of 
judicial impartiality.  Like a criminal justice system that declares all 
defendants guilty to be certain of incarcerating offenders, a recusal 
scheme that removes every judge whose integrity might be ques-
tioned regardless of actual bias cheapens the idea of judicial impar-
tiality to the point that judicial integrity means nothing at all.276 
 
 273. See Raymond J. McKoski, Reestablishing Actual Impartiality as the Funda-
mental Value of Judicial Ethics: Lessons from “Big Judge Davis,” 99 KY. L.J. 259, 289 
(2010) [hereinafter McKoski, Reestablishing] (“Today, judges suffer accusations of 
creating an appearance of impartiality under virtually limitless circumstances.”). 
 274. See generally Miller, supra note 238, at 460–61.  A recent Campbell Institute 
poll found that nearly seventy percent of survey participants believe that “[j]udges 
always say that their decisions are based on the law and the Constitution, but in many 
cases judges are really basing their decisions on their own personal beliefs.”  Keith J. 
Bybee, U.S. Public Perception of the Judiciary: Mixed Law and Politics, JURIST: LE-
GAL NEWS AND RESEARCH, Apr. 10, 2011, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/2011/04/us-
public-perception-of-the-judiciary-mixed-law-and-politics.php 
 275. Rotunda, supra note 252, at 1338. 
 276. See id. (“Unnecessarily imprecise ethics rules allow and tempt critics, with 
minimum effort, to levy a plausible and serious charge that the judge has violated 
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To be sure, this aggressive approach to recusal succeeds in remov-
ing numerous impartial judges, but it also disqualifies many integrious 
jurists who could have ruled impartially, simply because their presid-
ing would create the appearance of impropriety.277  “[Disqualifying 
judges] whenever there is an appearance of impropriety . . . leaves the 
door wide open to increasingly broad categories or characteristics 
that might give rise to an appearance of impropriety . . . .  Ultimately, 
this line of reasoning brings into question whether any case can be 
apparently impartially judged.”278  The public likely sees large num-
bers of disqualifications as indicative of a partial and untrustworthy 
justice system, which is, after all, precisely what a judge’s removal is 
supposed to signify.279  By disqualifying capable judges whenever en-
terprising attorneys dredge up facts that make the judges’ presiding 
look bad, the contemporary approach undermines public confidence 
in the integrity of the justice system.280 
The expansive, appearance-based approach to recusals may also 
under-enforce actual judicial impartiality.281  Professors Cravens and 
McKoski observe that the law often places the appearance of impar-
tiality before de facto impartiality such that “the appearance of fair-
ness is possibly more important than its actuality.”282  Disqualification 
 
ethics rules.  Overuse not only invites abuse with frivolous charges that have the pati-
na of legitimacy, but also may eventually demean the seriousness of the charge of be-
ing unethical.”); see also Christopher R. Carton, Comment, Disqualifying Judges for 
Bias: A Consideration of the Extrajudicial Bias Limitation for Disqualification Under 
28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 2057, 2057 (1994) (“[C]ommentators 
agree that while the standards for judicial disqualification have been textually broad-
ened, they are anything but ‘clear’ and that, consequently, public confidence in the 
impartiality of the judicial process is threatened.”).  Cf. Susan B. Hoekema, Com-
ment, Questioning the Impartiality of Judges: Disqualifying Federal District Court 
Judges Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 60 TEMP. L.Q. 697, 697–98 (1987) (articulating con-
cern that judicial interpretations of § 455 requiring an elevated standard of proof of 
bias and limiting the circumstances where bias can be found has wrongly limited the 
law’s intended purpose). 
 277. See McKoski, Reestablishing, supra note 273, at 289–90; Cravens, supra note 
11, at 12 & nn. 52–53. 
 278. Cravens, supra note 11, at 19. 
 279. See id. at 12 & nn. 52–53; see also THOMAS E. BAKER, THE GOOD JUDGE 55–
56 (1989). 
 280. See McKoski, Reestablishing, supra note 273, at 261. 
 281. See Cravens, supra note 11, at 13. 
 282. McKoski, Reestablishing, supra note 273, at 261, 290; see also Cravens, supra 
note 11, at 12–14; Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The Need to Curb 
Extreme Forms of Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1537, 1583 (2005) (“The appearance of impartiality is just as important, if not 
more important, as the reality of impartiality.” (citation omitted)); Bethany Krajelis, 
An Age-Old Debate Exists About Effect of Politics in the Judiciary, CHI. DAILY L. 
PILL_CHRISTENSEN 5/10/2012  12:43 PM 
2011] RECOVERING JUDICIAL INTEGRITY 561 
doctrine may consequently allow truly biased jurists to remain on the 
bench so long as they are circumspect enough to not externally mani-
fest their personal values.283  If true—or even if apparently credible—
this conclusion should give the public pause.  It is all well and good to 
have a justice system that looks integrious, but if it may not be so in 
reality how much trust does it deserve? 
Disqualification law’s expansive targeting of even remote appear-
ances of partiality undermines the seriousness of actually biased judg-
ing, and results in the over and under-enforcement of actual judicial 
impartiality.  The public is likely to view courts and judges—whose 
integrity can be called into question based on the scantest external 
indicators—as biased, partisan, and self-serving, a far cry from the 
kind of popular trust in the justice system that recusal law ought to 
engender.284 
3. The Failure of Modern Recusal Law to Engender an Integrious 
Judiciary 
All judges are biased,285 but integrious jurists suppress their impar-
tialities and decide cases based on the law, while unintegrious ones 
enforce their personal value judgments from the bench.  The root 
cause of biased judging, then, is a lack of personal and professional 
judicial integrity, defined as “probity, fairness, honesty, uprightness, 
 
BULL., Apr. 21, 2010, at 1 (quoting Malcolm C. Rich, Executive Director of the Chi-
cago Appleseed Fund for Justice, The Research Arm of The Chicago Council of 
Lawyers) (“You can’t have real justice until you have an appearance of justice.”). 
 283. See Cravens, supra note 11, at 13 (“[F]ocusing on appearances, and, more im-
portantly, on guesswork about the meaning of those appearances, fails to hold judges 
to account in a way that would ensure capture of whatever sources of actual bias 
might be . . . unapparent to outside observers, particularly if they are unapparent to 
the particular litigants in a given case . . . .”); see also id. at 20–21 (arguing that over-
emphasizing appearances may simply encourage judges to be less transparent in their 
decision-making). 
 284. For one recent example of an attempt to impinge a respected jurist’s integrity, 
see Mike McIntire, Friendship of Justice and Magnate Puts Focus on Ethics, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 18, 2011, at A1.  McIntire questioned Justice Clarence Thomas’s integri-
ty on the grounds of Thomas’s friendship with Harlan Crow, a real estate magnate, 
and Crow’s support for causes championed by both Thomas and his wife, for even 
though Crow was never himself a party to Supreme Court litigation, organizations on 
whose boards he served had filed amicus briefs in cases before the Court. Id.  It is 
precisely this sort of attenuated guilt-by-association argument that the current focus 
on appearances enables. See also McKoski, Reestablishing, supra note 273, at 273–75 
(examining the apparent partiality of an acknowledged integrious judge through the 
lens of modern recusal law). 
 285. See supra notes 244–45. 
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and soundness of character”286 and “the quality of being honest and 
having strong moral principles[,] moral uprightness.”287 Modern 
recusal law fails to foster these kinds of personal qualities because it 
mandatorily disqualifies judges in a wide array of questionable cir-
cumstances, leaving little room for judges to develop the integrity that 
is so essential to unbiased judging. 
Recusal law defines the conditions under which a judge is disquali-
fied due to actual or apparent impropriety, and directs a challenged 
judge to remove himself whenever those conditions are met.288  If a 
judge fails to disqualify himself when required to do so, his ruling in 
the matter may be reversed and his conduct severely criticized by an 
appellate court.289  Disqualification doctrines, however, do not direct 
or encourage judges to be honest, of sound moral character, or to de-
velop a strong, principled compass.290  Instead, the law takes a “bad 
man” view of judges291—it assumes that judges lack the integrity to 
voluntarily recuse themselves from cases in which their biases may 
sway their decision-making processes, and therefore, mandatorily 
disqualifies them in all questionable circumstances.  Thus, as Judge 
Kozinski notes, “there is a growing tendency to distrust judges—to 
craft more elaborate ethical rules and restrictions; to expand the 
scope of what is encompassed within the appearance of impropriety 
standard; to adopt more and better methods of intruding into judges’ 
private lives—all in a misguided effort to promote ethical judicial be-
havior.”292  Instead of engendering personal honesty and probity in 
judges by making them responsible for their own conduct, the current 
regime treats judges like naughty little children, kicking them out of 
the kitchen instead of instructing them to keep out of the cookie 
jar.293 
 
 286. ABA CODE, supra note 12, at 6. 
 287. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2011). 
 288. See generally supra Part I.A. 
 289. See Miller, supra note 238, at 462–64. 
 290. See supra notes 221–25 and accompanying text. 
 291. See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 
457 (1897). 
 292. Alex Kozinski, The Real Issues of Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 
1106 (2004). 
 293. See generally Robert P. George, The Central Tradition—Its Value and Lim-
its, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 43–47 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum, eds., 
2008) (arguing that moral goods often cannot be realized through legal compulsion, 
and that to facilitate individual moral integrity the law must sometimes decline to 
regulate so as to enable individuals to make themselves moral). 
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This paternalistic approach to ensuring impartial judging is, in part, 
a result of modern recusal law’s focus on appearances.294  Even if 
judges were trusted to police themselves, under the current approach, 
they could not do so because the arrangement would appear ques-
tionable.  Whatever mandatory disqualification rules accomplish in 
terms of appearances, however, is likely negated by their failure to 
promote actual integrity, the real panacea for biased judging.295  By 
falling short of fostering integrious judges, the system leaves itself 
open to abuse at the hands of dishonest jurists dedicated to using the 
courts to further their own agendas. 
B. Duty-Focused Disqualification: Some Proposals 
The drawbacks of rights-based recusal law highlight the need to 
comprehensively rethink the premises and substantive standards of 
the disqualification system.  This Section suggests that recusal law 
might be reconceptualized based on the halachic system’s duty-
oriented approach, which emphasizes personal and professional judi-
cial integrity while still protecting litigants from actually biased judg-
ments.  Professor Leubsdorf notes that “[t]o decide when a judge may 
not sit is to define what a judge is.  To define what a judge is is to de-
cide what a system of adjudication is all about.”296  Subpart III.B.1. 
therefore begins by developing a duty-focused conception of the roles 
of courts and judges in the American adjudicatory system.  With this 
theoretical foundation in place, Subparts III.B.2. and III.B.3. argue 
that recusal law should limit mandatory disqualification to preserving 
courts’ third-party institutional role, and that judges should be given 
the latitude to develop personal and professional integrity by policing 
their own biases. Subpart III.B.4 suggests that recusal law should deal 
with unintegrious judges’ failings to recuse when required through a 
system of peer review and sanctions and by examining the substance 
of their decisions for actual bias. 
1. Thinking About the Roles of Courts and Judges in the American 
 
 294. See Howard T. Markey, A Need for Continuing Education in Judicial Ethics, 
28 VAL. U. L. REV. 647, 653 (1994) (“In building and maintaining the image of the 
judiciary, it is the reasonable perception of the people that counts—and that is all 
that counts.”); Roger J. Miner, Judicial Ethics in the Twenty-First Century: Tracing 
the Trends, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1107, 1110 (2004) (stating that a recusal standard 
defined in terms of appearances is not surprising because “in modern-day society, it is 
perception, rather than reality, that has the greater importance”). 
 295. See McKoski, Reestablishing, supra note 273, at 300. 
 296. Leubsdorf, supra note 29, at 237. 
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System of Adjudication 
At their core, courts provide a means of disinterested third-party 
dispute resolution in accordance with normative legal rules previously 
acceded to by litigants.297  Whatever other legislative, executive, and 
administrative functions modern courts may serve in practice, dispute 
resolution remains their raison d’être—the role which courts’ other 
non-adjudicative activities support.298 
This conception of courts’ adjudicatory purpose features strongly 
in the western political-legal tradition.  John Locke posited that the 
chief motivation for the creation of civil societies and legal systems 
was the need to provide a neutral, principled basis for settling disa-
greements.299  Individuals driven by malice, self-interest, or reasona-
ble judgments made from different perspectives disagree about how 
to resolve their conflicts.300  Members of society establish legal sys-
tems to provide a mutually agreeable framework for resolving con-
flicts, thereby committing themselves to resolve disputes based on 
rules they themselves have a hand in making.301  No system of laws 
can be so perfectly crafted as to leave no room for dispute.  Laws may 
be vague, and subject to competing reasonable interpretations; dis-
putes may arise from novel factual circumstances not adequately ad-
dressed by existing frameworks; and parties may disagree about the 
facts underlying their dispute, or about the relevance of the broader 
social implications of their conflict.302  Individuals may also disagree 
about how legal norms ought to be applied in individual cases.303  
Maintaining a court system tasked with resolving disputes in accord-
 
 297. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, ET AL., THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW 45 
(6th ed. 2004); H.M. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 185–86 (1958); Abram Chayes, The Role of 
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282, 1285–88 (1976). 
 298. See generally THE ROLE OF COURTS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: THE FINAL RE-
PORT OF THE COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF COURTS 40–44 (Jethro K. Lieberman ed., 
1984). 
 299. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 269–78 (Peter Laslett ed., 
1960). 
 300. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES 11–12 
(2001). 
 301. See id. at 12; Cravens, supra note 11, at 24 (“[T]he function of law is to pro-
vide for the reasoned settlement of normative disagreements.”). See generally Ber-
man, supra note 297, at 24–35. 
 302. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 300, at 12. 
 303. See id.  
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ance with established procedures and accepted legal norms remedies 
this problem.304 
Courts thus function to provide mutually agreeable conflict resolu-
tions in cases where the mere existence of a rule of law or accepted 
standard of conduct is not enough.  Courts must act as disinterested 
third-party deciders; when a court is a party to a case, it quite simply 
ceases being a court.  This idea, which is often expressed conclusorily 
with the maxim that “no man may be a judge in his own case,”305 goes 
to the very essence of what a court is and does.306  Courts do what liti-
gants cannot: decide cases in a mutually agreeable manner based on 
legal norms and untarnished by personal interests in the result.  When 
a court decides a case to which it is a party, however, its ruling is not a 
judicial decision, but the imposition of one litigant’s self-interested 
view of the law upon others, the very antithesis of the rule of law.307  
To maintain their institutional legitimacy, therefore, courts must pre-
serve their characteristic third-party vantage relative to the cases they 
decide.308 
Judges’ professional duty emerges from this conception of courts’ 
third-party institutional role as an obligation to resolve litigious dis-
putes by reasonably applying legal norms to the facts of each case in a 
neutral and impartial manner.  Whether judges are passive referees or 
active problem solvers,309 whether they discover existing rules of law 
and apply them to new circumstances or create new legal principles to 
address evolving social norms,310 their judicial task is essentially the 
 
 304. See id. at 12–15; LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 56 (1964) (“In a 
complex and numerous political society courts perform an essential function.  No sys-
tem of law—whether it be judge-made or legislatively enacted—can be so perfectly 
drafted as to leave no room for dispute.  When a dispute arises concerning the mean-
ing of a particular rule, some provision for a resolution of the dispute is necessary.  
The most apt way to achieve this resolution lies in some form of judicial proceed-
ing.”). 
 305. COKE, supra note 21, at 141a; see supra note 21. 
 306. See JOHN S. MURRAY, ALAN SCOTT RAU & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, PROCESSES 
OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 16 (2d ed. 1996) (“‘Adjudication’ 
refers to the process by which . . . authoritative decisions are rendered by a neutral 
third party.”). 
 307. See supra notes 127–32 and accompanying text. 
 308. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 300, at 15–17; see also JEREMY 
WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 7 (1999). 
 309. See Chayes, supra note 297. 
 310. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 777 (1976) (discussing 
various approaches to judicial decision making); see also Thomas B. Griffith, Was 
Bork Right About Judges?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 157 (2011). 
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same: to carry out the courts’ institutional function by disinterestedly 
resolving disputes in accordance with accepted rules of law. 
As human embodiments of the judicial institution, judges cannot 
be personally interested in the cases they decide.  Interested judges 
are merely litigants in robes who cease functioning in a judicial capac-
ity, and instead impose their own self-referential view of the case on 
the other parties.311  Judges therefore cannot preside over cases in 
which they have a litigious interest. 
In addition to adhering to the formalistic requirements that pre-
serve courts’ disinterested third-party vantage, judges are also obli-
gated to rule correctly based on accepted legal norms.  Litigants turn 
to courts to resolve their disputes, not only because they provide a 
disinterested third-party forum—if process was their sole concern, 
disputants would submit their disagreements to any number of 
cheaper, quicker, and less adversarial alternative dispute resolution 
venues.312  Parties come to court, in part, because courts are supposed 
to resolve disputes in accordance with legal rules to which the liti-
gants have consented and upon which they have relied in structuring 
their relationships.313  Judges’ power over litigants thus stems from all 
parties’ common commitment to the law, and judges may not use 
their positions to supplant the rule of law with personal value judg-
ments under the guise of judicial process.314  The duty to exercise au-
thority over others only in accordance with the law to which all have 
assented is of course incumbent on all citizens,315 and is particularly 
important with respect to judges who, by virtue of their professional 
positions have a unique ability to violate their trust, but because of 
 
 311. See supra notes 124–31 and accompanying text. 
 312. See Linda Mealey-Lohman & Eduardo Wolle, Pockets of Innovation in Min-
nesota’s Alternative Dispute Resolution Journey, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 441, 442 
(2006) (“Legal practitioners use the term ADR to cover a wide variety of processes 
that involve a neutral third party to help resolve disputes or conflicts.”).  
 313. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3–6 (1990); Jeremy Wal-
dron, Lucky in Your Judge, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRY 185, 200 (2008). 
 314. See Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial Duty and the Supreme Court’s 
Cult of Celebrity, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (2010) (“What judges should 
never do is use the power of their office to change the law to suit their own personal 
notions of what the law should be.”). 
 315. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Positivism and the Good Lawyer: A 
Commentary on W. Bradley Wendel’s Lawyers and Fidelity to Law, 24 GEO. J. LE-
GAL ETHICS 1165, 1167 (2011) (“Citizens have a prima facie duty to obey the law; this 
is a moral duty whose content is supplied by a political process, and in this sense it is 
a duty rooted in political morality.”). 
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what they represent, must be that much more cautious not to do so.316  
As professionals, then, judges may not use their third-party position 
to give just any answers to the questions posed by litigants; they must 
give answers that are grounded in and justified under the law.317 
Parties’ expectation to be judged in accordance with accepted legal 
norms does not mean that jurists must give the right legal solution to 
each case.  Most often, there is no singularly correct answer to any 
but the most simplistic legal queries,318 and the very fact that a dispute 
must be adjudicated indicates that it has a number of reasonably cor-
rect resolutions based on legal norms.319  A judge’s professional duty, 
therefore, is to resolve disputes in one of potentially many legally jus-
tifiable ways, not necessarily a single, objectively correct way.320  In 
some sense, preserving courts’ third-party institutional position is 
more important than the substance of judges’ adjudicatory disposi-
tions.  When litigants reasonably disagree about the correct legal res-
olution to their dispute, it does not much matter whose view a judge 
enforces since both are reasonably grounded in the law.  What does 
matter is that the judge’s ruling emanates from a disinterested third-
party court that reached a particular decision not because that was 
the view advocated by the one litigant or the other, but because the 
judge neutrally and independently determined that that was the best 
 
 316. See Sarah M. Buel, Access to Meaningful Remedy: Overcoming Doctrinal 
Obstacles in Tort Litigation Against Domestic Violence Offenders, 83 OR. L. REV. 
945, 970 (2004) (“[J]udges’ authority and vast power invest in them a greater respon-
sibility not only to uphold the law and not supplant their own biases, but also to shine 
as a beacon of reasonableness and fair play.”). 
 317. See generally KEITH C. CULVER, READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 144–
92 (2007) (presenting, contrasting, and elaborating on H.L.A. Hart’s and Ronald 
Dworkin’s views on the nature of a judge’s task). 
 318. See Discussion: The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Inter-
preting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 386, 386 (1988); see also infra note 353. 
 319. See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: As-
sessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 536–43 (1981) (showing a 
winnowing process from grievance, to claim, to disputed claim, to the use of lawyers 
and courts); cf. SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 234 (2011). 
 320. See Cravens, supra note 11, at 24–25 (“[Adjudication] is not about requiring a 
judge to give the one right reason, but about giving at least a right reason and an ex-
planation of why it is a . . . right reason in this case.”).  But see RONALD DWORKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 279–90 (1977) (arguing that even the hardest legal ques-
tions can, under the lens of proper judging, admit of one right answer); 
Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY 58–84 
(P.M.S. Hacker & Joseph Raz eds., 1977) (same).  On the so-called indeterminacy 
thesis that most legal questions do not have any singularly correct answer, see gener-
ally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 86–
90 (2004).   
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legal solution to the conflict.321  Thus, the fact that a dispute is rea-
sonably settled in accordance with legal norms by a disinterested third 
party often overshadows the precise substance of the resolution.322  
As Justice Brandeis opined, “[i]t is sometimes more important that 
the applicable rule of law be settled [by the court] than that it be set-
tled right.”323  While a judge’s ruling is likely only one of many legally 
correct resolutions, it can nevertheless be treated as process-
authoritative because it emanates from a disinterested, third-party 
court.324 
Judges’ obligations are not exhausted by their issuing substantively 
just rulings.  As representatives of the court, judges must act in a way 
that inspires confidence in courts’ ability to disinterestedly adjudicate 
disputes based on legal norms.325  Judicial conduct that engenders 
even incorrect impressions of partiality discredits courts’ institutional 
legitimacy, and also detracts from a vigorous adversarial process, be-
cause litigants who are given reason to believe the system is weighted 
against them are less likely to energetically press their cause.326  Judg-
es, therefore, are personally obligated to maintain the appearance of 
justice, even above that which is necessary to ensure substantively 
correct third-party rulings, by insuring that all parties are, and believe 
they are, equal under the law.327 
 
 321. In Jewish law, the principle that judicial authority stems from a court’s third-
party position, rather than from the singular legal correctness of its rulings is illus-
trated by Talmudic discussion that indicates that while God’s interpretations of To-
rah law are undoubtedly correct, they are not authoritative as against the judgments 
of competent human halachic authorities. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BAVA 
METZIAH 59b; JERUSALEM TALMUD, MOED KATAN 3:1; Menachem Elon, Law, 
Truth, and Peace: “The Three Pillars of the World”, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 439, 
450–53 (1997). 
 322. Cf. Thomas McCarthy, Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: Rawls 
and Habermas in Dialogue, 105 ETHICS 44, 57 (1994) (approving the idea that those 
who regard a decision-making process as “basically just” can accept as legiti-
mate specific, resulting decisions that of which do not approve). 
 323. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting). 
 324. See Austin Sarat & Joel B. Grossman, Courts and Conflict Resolution: Prob-
lems in the Mobilization of Adjudication 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1200 (1975). 
 325. See supra notes 16–20; supra Part I.B.2.c. 
 326. See, e.g., RASHI to SHEVUOS 30a (s.v. Sheloh Y’hei Echad Omed) (“So that 
one party should not see that [the court] honors his opponent more than himself, and 
as a result” be intimidated into “silencing himself.”).  
 327. See supra notes Part I.B.2.c. 
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2. Curtail the Role of Mandatory Disqualification in Eliminating 
Judicial Bias 
Based on this jurisprudential conception of the roles of courts and 
judges in the adjudicatory process, duty-focused recusal reform 
should begin by limiting the scope of mandatory disqualification to 
instances that implicate the institutional integrity of the courts.  The 
current doctrine’s use of mandatory disqualification to prevent actual 
and apparent judicial bias fails to protect litigants’ rights or engender 
actual judicial integrity.328  The halachic model suggests that these 
aims might be better achieved by limiting top-down disqualification 
to cases where the judge’s sitting would be incompatible with the 
court’s fundamental third-party role.329 
Judges should be disqualified only when their connection to a case 
is incompatible with the courts’ requisite third-party posture.  In cir-
cumstances where a judge has a litigious interest in a case, the judge 
should be disqualified—legally incapacitated from acting as a judge—
because interested jurists literally cease to exist in a judicial capacity 
and instead take on the role of a litigious parties.330  If a judge decides 
a case to which he is a party, therefore, his disposition is not a judicial 
ruling in any real sense, even if it is substantively correct.331  A ruling 
by a judge-litigant amounts to one party’s imposing its own self-
interested view of the law on the others and is incompatible with the 
courts’ institutional function.  Interested judges should be mandatori-
ly disqualified and their rulings voided not because they are, or may 
be, biased in favor of their interests, but because their sitting cannot 
be squared with courts’ adjudicatory role, no matter how impartial 
and integrious they may be. 
Disqualification should not be used to police judicial impartiality.  
The current recusal scheme disqualifies judges who are or appear to 
be biased,332 but problems in this approach demonstrate that the law 
is ill-suited to determine judges’ subjective impartiality, and that it 
therefore tends to over and under-enforce judicial bias.333  Disqualifi-
cation for bias also impinges on removed judges’ integrity, and there-
 
 328. See generally supra Parts III.A.1, III.A.3.  
 329. See supra Part I.B.2.a. 
 330. See supra notes 305–07, 311 and accompanying text. 
 331. See supra notes 124–31 and accompanying text. 
 332. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text.  See generally supra Part I.A.2. 
 333. See generally supra Part III.A.  
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fore uses flexible standards to resist removal,334 undermining public 
trust in the courts and threatening litigants’ rights.335  Recusal law 
might detach itself from this pernicious association between disquali-
fication and integrity by limiting disqualification to instances where a 
judge’s presiding would be incompatible with the court’s fundamental 
third-party role in the adjudicatory process.336  By using disqualifica-
tion to police institutional boundaries rather than to indicate profes-
sional malfeasance, duty-focused recusal law might avoid the many 
problems associated with trying to legally determine judges’ subjec-
tive biases, make judges more willing to step down in disqualifying 
circumstances, and thus preserve litigants’ rights and public confi-
dence in the institutional integrity of the courts. 
3. Expand Judges’ Professional Obligation to Voluntarily Recuse 
Duty-driven limitations on mandatory disqualification should be 
complemented by an expansion of judges’ personal and professional 
duty to voluntarily remove themselves from cases that strongly impli-
cate their personal values.  The current doctrine controls biased judg-
ing by mandatorily disqualifying partial judges.  The halachic tradi-
tion, by contrast, suggests that impartial judging is better achieved by 
giving judges the opportunity to assess their own biases and 
integriously removing themselves from cases they feel they cannot 
judge with complete, actual and apparent impartiality. 
The law should instruct judges to voluntarily recuse themselves 
from cases that, in their self-aware judgment, their presiding over may 
result in a miscarriage of justice.  As judicial professionals, judges 
should step down when they feel they may unintentionally fail to up-
hold their duty to rule “truthfully and honestly.”  As private citizens, 
judges should recognize their personal obligation to recuse rather 
than risk imposing their personal values on others due to uncontrol-
lable bias. 
To effectively police their own impartiality, “[j]udges need to be 
ever cognizant of the effect their own personal biases have on their 
decision-making process” in ways that are not presently empha-
sized.337  “At a minimum, judges should mentally list potential biases 
 
 334. See, e.g., United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1203 (7th Cir. 1985) (not-
ing that “a judge may be especially reluctant to recuse himself when to do so requires 
him to admit that his actual bias or prejudice has been proved”). 
 335. See generally supra Part III.A.  
 336. See supra notes 124–31 and accompanying text. 
 337. Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 58 (1994). 
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that may permeate their decision-making process . . . and, with every 
decision, ask themselves, ‘[c]ould any of my biases affect this deci-
sion?’”338  If, after an honest self-evaluation, a judge fears that his 
personal values may taint his decision-making process, he should vol-
untarily recuse himself.  While urging judges to err on the side of cau-
tion and recuse in doubtful cases is inconsistent with the duty to sit,339 
the duty cannot be reasonably construed as an obligation to remain 
on the bench when doing so may well result in injustice.340 
In a duty-oriented system, the decision to recuse cannot rest on the 
law’s conclusory determination of actual or apparent bias, but must 
be made by each judge based on a self-aware evaluation of his own 
impartiality.  Contemporary recusal law attempts to preserve judicial 
impartiality by mandatorily disqualifying judges that, in the law’s ob-
jective judgment, are or appear biased.  This approach, however, fails 
to consistently control actual bias or engender a integrious duty-
conscious judiciary.341  Duty-focused voluntary recusal might avoid 
conclusory and inconsistent bias-based disqualification standards by 
empowering judges who are best situated to know their own minds to 
determine whether they can judge a case impartially.  Moreover, by 
policing their own impartiality and controlling their natural desire to 
vindicate their personal values from the bench, judges might develop 
their own moral integrity, building a foundation for future impartial 
judging.  Additionally, by demonstrating the integrity, humility, and 
self-discipline to voluntarily recuse from cases that could compromise 
their ability to rule with complete impartiality, a duty-focused judici-
ary might engender public confidence in the courts in a way that the 
current doctrine does not. 
4. Ensure Sound Legal Judgments and Promote Integrious Judging 
Jewish law suggests that duty-focused recusal law should use sub-
stantive appellate review of judges’ decisions and peer review backed 
by sanctions to ensure that judges maintain the highest standards of 
integrity and impartiality.  Curtailing mandatory disqualification and 
giving judges the opportunity to develop their own integrity through 
voluntary recusal gives dishonest jurists the opportunity to wrongfully 
vindicate their personal values under the guise of judicial rulings.  Du-
ty-focused recusal law, therefore, cannot rely exclusively on the good 
 
 338. Id. 
 339. See supra notes 269–71 and accompanying text. 
 340. See generally Stempel, supra note 21. 
 341. See supra Parts III.A.1, 3. 
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will of duty-conscious judges to ensure impartial judging; it must also 
address the inevitability that some judges’ personal interests will get 
the better of them, leading them to issue biased decisions that sup-
plant litigants’ legal rights. 
Ideally, the law should prevent problems before they arise.  If duty-
focused recusal law expects judges to act integriously, it should work 
to insure that only those of the highest moral character don judicial 
robes.  Traditional Jewish law requires dayanim to exhibit traits that 
go to the heart of the judicial role.342  American recusal law, too, 
should try ensuring an honest judiciary by using judicial oversight 
boards to investigate judicial candidates’ integrity before they ascend 
to the bench.343  These boards should be comprised of sitting and re-
tired judges who are likely best situated to evaluate candidates’ char-
acter qualifications and aptitude for integrious judicial practice.344  
While judicial discipline commissions exist in every state, and in the 
federal court system as well, they do not typically engage in pre-
appointment vetting of judicial candidates.345  These commissions 
should be authorized to undertake such investigations of those that 
hold themselves out to become judges, thereby helping prevent prob-
lems before they can arise.346 
Prophylactic measures are no guarantee of complete success, how-
ever.  Unintegrious candidates may slide through the vetting process, 
and ordinarily honest judges might occasionally allow their personal 
interests to get the better of them in the course of their duties.  The 
 
 342. See supra note 143. 
 343. See generally An Introduction to Aretaic Theories on Law, in VIRTUE JURIS-
PRUDENCE 7–16 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008) (laying out a “the-
ory of uncontested judicial virtues” that all can agree are integral to good judging). 
 344. State legislatures might require candidates for elected judicial office to receive 
a favorable review by a board comprised of state judges before being allowed to ap-
pear on the ballot.  Candidates nominated to the federal bench could be vetted by 
national or circuit-specific judicial panels staffed by sitting and retired judges with 
whom the nominee would not work closely if confirmed.  Such boards, restricted to 
screening nominees’ character and integrity might offer non-binding recommenda-
tions to the Senate about nominees’ ethical fitness, thereby avoiding conflict with 
constitutional advise-and-consent requirements.  For a short discussion of the virtues 
and dangers of merit selection of judges, see Miller, supra note 238, at 467–69. 
 345. See Gray, infra note 348, at 408–09 (discussing some commissions’ very lim-
ited authority to discipline sitting judges for actions they took prior to ascending to 
the bench, and implying that review boards certainly have no jurisdiction to investi-
gate judicial candidates); Hellman, infra note 348, at 427 (“[O]rdinarily, the [discipli-
nary] process begins with the [post hoc] filing of a complaint about a judge with the 
clerk of the court of appeals for the circuit.”).   
 346. For suggestions of relevant factors that vetting boards should consider, see 
sources cited supra note 143, and infra note 358. 
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current disqualification scheme addresses post hoc allegations of judi-
cial misconduct through appellate review of judges’ recusal deci-
sions347 and disciplinary action by government-sponsored judicial 
conduct review commissions.348  This approach suffers from several 
problems, however, and is in any case ill-suited to a duty-focused 
recusal regime.  Appellate courts typically reverse judges’ recusal de-
cisions only for an abuse of discretion,349 which merely reflects and 
compounds the problems related to the original disposition, including 
vagueness, malleability, and inconsistency.350  Critics also identify 
several problems with the current disciplinary commission scheme.351  
From the perspective of duty-jurisprudence, however, perhaps the 
greatest difficulty with contemporary appellate and commission re-
 
 347. See supra notes 238–39 and accompanying text. 
 348. See generally Cynthia Gray, How Judicial Conduct Commissions Work, 28 
JUST. SYS. J. 405 (2007) (outlining the jurisdictions, functions, and constitutions of 
State judicial discipline boards); Arthur D. Hellman, Judges Judging Judges: The 
Federal Judicial Misconduct Statutes and the Breyer Committee Report, 28 JUST. 
SYS. J. 426 (2007) (explaining the framework for judicial discipline in the Federal sys-
tem).  
 349. See In re Triple S Rests, Inc., 422 F.3d 405, 417 (6th Cir. 2005); Omega Eng’g, 
Inc. v. Omega, 432 F.3d 437, 447 (2d Cir. 2005); Selkridge v. United Of Omaha Life 
Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 166 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Where a motion for disqualification was 
made in the District Court, we review the denial of such a motion for abuse of discre-
tion.”); United States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 665 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Ayala, 289 F.3d 16, 27 (1st Cir. 2002) (“We review the refusal of a trial judge to recu-
se himself for abuse of discretion.”); Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 289 F.3d 648, 659 
(10th Cir. 2002); In re City of Houston, 745 F.2d 925, 927 (5th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he de-
termination of the judge concerned should be accorded great weight, and should not 
be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.”);  People v. Moreno, 515 N.E.2d 200, 202 
(N.Y. 1987) (“A court’s decision in this respect may not be overturned unless it was 
an abuse of discretion.”); Commonwealth v. Bonds, 890 A.2d 414  (Pa. 2005) (“Our 
standard of review of a trial court’s determination not to recuse from hearing a case is 
exceptionally deferential. We recognize that our trial judges are ‘honorable, fair and 
competent,’ and although we employ an abuse of discretion standard, we do so rec-
ognizing that the judge himself is best qualified to gauge his ability to preside impar-
tially.”). See generally FLAMM, supra note 10, at 983–88. 
 350. See supra notes 253–64 and accompanying text; see also Jeffrey W. Stemple, 
Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!? Giving Adequate Attention to Failings of Judicial 
Impartiality, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 65 (2010) (noting that “[f]rom the halls of the 
U.S. Supreme Court to the local judiciary and state disciplinary boards, it appears 
that judges who fail to recuse when they should seldom face significant consequences 
or criticism.”).  While some courts review recusal decisions de novo, see, for example, 
O’Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 997–1088 (7th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Moody, 997 F.2d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1992); State v. O’Neill, 663 N.W.2d 
292, 297 (Wis. App. 2002), this more exacting standard of review simply reflects the 
problems inherent in the original disposition of recusal motions, see supra Part III.A., 
with an additional layer of unpredictability at the appellate level.   
 351. See Miller, supra note 238, at 467–69. 
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view is that it tries to coerce judicial integrity by reversing the deci-
sions and disciplining partial judges who fail to remove themselves 
when mandatorily disqualified.352 
Biased rulings should be remedied through ordinary appellate pro-
cedures providing substantive review of allegedly partial judges’ final 
dispositions.  Judges are obligated to issue correct rulings reasonably 
grounded in legal norms, but litigants are not entitled to any particu-
lar legally justifiable decision.353  When an allegedly partial judge’s 
ruling is reasonably grounded in the law, therefore, a reviewing court 
should uphold the decision, notwithstanding the ethical impropriety 
of the challenged judge’s failure to recuse.354  A biased judge’s failure 
to recuse himself may seriously impinge his integrity, but it does not 
itself speak to the substantive validity of his otherwise legally sound 
decisions.355  The losing litigant will have received his due—a decision 
reasonably based on accepted legal norms—and should not be al-
lowed to burden his opponent and the court system with new pro-
ceedings simply because the trial judge had personal biases unless his 
prejudices perverted the judicial decision making process.356  Appel-
late courts should reverse allegedly biased rulings only if those deci-
sions cannot be justified on the basis of legal norms and thus repre-
sent the deciding judges’ subversion of litigants’ rights in favor of his 
own personal values. 
 
 352. For a discussion of why such coercion undermines the basic ends of duty-
focused recusal, compare supra Parts III.A.3., III.B.2., III.B.3. 
 353. See supra notes 318–23 and accompanying text. Compare Christine Hayes, 
Legal Truth, Right Answers and Best Answers: Dworkin and the Rabbis, 25 DINE 
ISRAEL 73 (2008) (arguing that while in the halachic system there is often one best 
answer to a given legal question, this does not mean that there is only one halachicly 
legitimate answer), with Richard Hidary, Right Answers Revisited: Monism and Plu-
ralism in the Talmud, 26 DINE ISRAEL 229 (2010) (arguing, contrary to Hayes, that in 
fact the Jewish law tradition maintains that there can be any number of ontologically 
correct answers to a given legal issue all reasonably grounded in Torah norms). 
 354. See Cravens, supra note 11, at 36–40; see also United States v. Vespe, 868 
F.2d 1328, 1342 (3d Cir. 1989); Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Conflicts of Interest in Bush 
v. Gore: Did Some Justices Vote Illegally, 16 GEO. J. L. ETHICS 375, 440 n.375 (2003) 
(“Where an appellant complains that a trial judge who should have recused himself 
granted or denied a summary judgment, or made another decision that is reviewed 
on appeal de novo anyway, it may be particularly appropriate to treat 
the failure to recuse as harmless because de novo review prevents any harm that a 
biased judge could inflict.”). 
 355. See Pierce v. Pierce, 39 P.3d 791, 799 (Okla. 2001) (holding that the issuing 
judge’s bias is no reason to vacate an otherwise substantively just decision); supra 
notes 137–138; see also Tennant v. Marion Health Care Found., Inc., 459 S.E.2d 374, 
386 (W. Va. 1995) (holding that violation of the recusal standard “involving only the 
appearance of impropriety does not automatically require a new trial”). 
 356. See supra notes 318–27. 
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Substantive appellate review only corrects actually biased rulings 
grounded in judges’ personal prejudices.  It fails to ensure an 
integrious judiciary, however, because it does not examine or correct 
allegedly biased judges’ erroneous decisions not to recuse.  A duty-
oriented system should therefore review and sanction judicial mis-
conduct using judicially-sponsored discipline commissions.357  The 
commissions should be organized by state bar or judicial associations 
or informally by judges themselves rather than by the government, 
and they should be staffed by sitting or retired judges well-attuned to 
the pressures and nuances of judicial practice.  The committees’ ac-
tions would then symbolically and actually stem from the duty-
conscious, self-disciplining members of the judiciary themselves ra-
ther than from the government.  In examining a judge’s allegedly 
wrongful failure to recuse himself, disciplinary commissions could 
flexibly review the facts surrounding the complaint, and in crafting 
appropriate sanctions, consider the nature and extent of the judge’s 
misconduct, his culpability, his response to the commission’s investi-
gation, and his past reputation and record.358  Independent, flexible, 
and integriously firm disciplinary commissions might thus police 
judges’ integrity in a way that inspires public confidence in the courts, 
fosters judges’ personal and professional integrity, and protects liti-
gants from actually partial judging. 
CONCLUSION 
Judging is a human endeavor, and biased judging, at its core, is a 
human problem.  “As the face of every person is unique, so too are 
their thoughts and minds different.”359  The issues arising from our 
concern for impartial judging and judge disqualification are as varied 
as the diverse personalities that comprise our judiciary.  No system, 
 
 357. See McKoski, Reestablishing, supra note 273, at 300 (2010); see also Ronald J. 
Rotunda, Judicial Transparency, Judicial Ethics, and a Judicial Solution: An Inspec-
tor General for the Courts, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 301 (2011) (advocating the appoint-
ment of an inspector general for the Federal court to oversee and enforce judicial in-
tegrity).  Discipline commissions are currently employed by Federal and State courts, 
though these bodies suffer from a number of serious criticisms. See generally Miller, 
supra note 238, at 467–69; Stemple, supra note 350, at 75. 
 358. See In re Coffey’s Case, 949 A.2d 102, 115 (N.H. 2008); CYNTHIA GRAY, 
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY STUDY OF STATE JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE 81–82 
(2002); see also In re Deming, 736 P.2d 639, 659 (Wash. 1987) (listing ten factors to 
be considered by review boards in determining the appropriate punishment for judi-
cial misconduct). See generally McKoski, Reestablishing, supra note 273, at 302–03. 
 359. MIDRASH RABBAH, NUMBERS 21; see also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BERACHOS 
58a. 
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however well designed, can fully account for the variables of individ-
ual conduct.  To be effective, recusal law cannot, as it does now, rely 
on systemic restraints on partial judges.  Addressing the problem of 
biased judging must begin at the bottom by engendering actual judi-
cial integrity on a human level.  The Torah’s universal aspirational 
call, “[t]zedek, tzedek tirdof [justice, justice shall you pursue]!”360 
cannot be legislated, but must be adopted and internalized by judges 
imbued with a solemn sense of purpose, duty, and self-awareness.  
Perhaps Judge Kozinski put it best:  
Ultimately, there is no choice but to trust the judges. . . .  [W]e’d all 
be better off in a world with fewer rules and a more clear-cut under-
standing that impartiality and diligence are obligations that perme-
ate every aspect of judicial life—obligations that each judge has the 
unflagging responsibility to police for himself.361 
 
 360. Deuteronomy 16:20. 
 361. Kozinski, supra note 292, at 1106. 
